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C ertain	 objects	 are	 naturally	 grouped	 together;	 they	 have	something	in	common.	Realists	claim	that	this	fact	demands	explanation.	For	illustration,	imagine	that	the	world	is	restrict-
ed	 to	 the	 contents	of	 a	box,	 of	which	one	might	offer	 the	 following	
ordinary	description:
Box World:	There	is	a	blue	sphere.	There	is	a	green	cube.	
There	is	an	orange	sphere.	There	is	a	blue	cone.
This	world	is	supposed	to	share	crucial	features	with	our	own.	There	
are	a	number	of	objects	that	fall	into	natural	groupings.	For	instance,	
the	blue	sphere	and	the	blue	cone	naturally	go	together.	They	share 
something	that	the	others	don’t.	Realists	posit	an	entity	that	is	instanti-
ated	by	both	 the	sphere	and	 the	cone	 in	order	 to	explain	what	 they	
have	in	common.	This	entity	is	called	a universal.	It	is	a	single thing	that	
the	many objects	have	in	common.	Following	David	Armstrong	(1980),	
let	us	call	the	realist’s	demand	for	an	explanation	of	this	grouping	the 
one-over-many problem.
Nominalists	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 posit	 universals.	 According	 to	 the	
nominalist,	 the	world	 contains	 only	 particular	 things.	 In	 this	 paper,	
we	 are	 concerned	 with	 a	 specific	 brand	 of	 nominalism	 that	makes	
no	concessions	in	response	to	the	realist’s	demand	for	explanation.	A	
nominalist	of	this	brand	acknowledges	that	the	sphere	and	cone	have	
something	in	common:	they	are	both	blue.	However,	she	offers	noth-
ing	 further	 to	explain	 this	 commonality.	Armstrong	 (1978:	 16;	 1980)	
calls	a	nominalist	of	this	variety	an	ostrich,	since	she	purportedly	sticks	
her	head	in	the	sand	in	response	to	the	one-over-many-problem.1
The	ostrich	 says	 that	 she	does	not	posit	or	ontologically	 commit	
to universals.	 To	 support	 this	 claim,	 ostrich	 nominalists	 universally	
1.	 Devitt	 (1980)	 rejects	 the	 label	 ‘ostrich	 nominalist’	 and	 argues	 that,	 instead,	
philosophers	who	posit	universals	in	response	to	the	so-called	one-over-many	
problem	are	mirage realists:	they	adopt	realism	as	a	response	to	a	problem	that	
isn’t	really	there.	Despite	this	criticism,	we	shall	use	the	label	‘ostrich	nominal-
ist’	for	those	philosophers	who	(i)	do	not	posit	universals,	and	(ii)	do	not	view	
the	 realist’s	explanatory	demand	(i. e.	 the	one-over-many-problem)	as	 legiti-
mate.	We	use	this	label	solely	for	ease	of	exposition;	the	use	of	it	should	not	be	
taken	to	indicate	that	we	view	the	realist’s	explanatory	demand	as	legitimate.
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According	to	this	received	view,	the	ostrich’s	preferred	theory	has	the	
advantage	of	a	more	parsimonious	ontology	than	the	realist’s	when	
both	 are	 assessed	 by	Quine’s	 criterion.	As	 the	 ostrich	 presents	 the	
matter,	 the	realist’s	 theory	says	 that	 there	are	more	 things:	 it	posits	
universals	in	addition	to	the	particulars.
In	 this	 paper,	we’ll	 grant	 that	 standard	demands	 for	 explanation	
should	fail	 to	move	the	ostrich.	However,	we’ll	argue	that	 this	 is	be-
side	the	point.	The	ostrich’s	claim	to	parsimony	is	simply	wrong,	even	
according	to	Quine’s	criterion.	We’ll	argue	that	properly	counting	the	
ostrich’s	commitments	using	Quine’s	criterion	yields	a	less	parsimoni-
ous	ontology	than	that	of	her	realist	rivals.	To	make	our	position	clear:	
we	are	not	trying	to	argue	that	any	possible	nominalist	theory	is	less	
parsimonious	than	any	possible	realist	theory.	Rather,	we	aim	to	show	
that	nominalist	 theories	 that	have	a	chance	of	describing	 the	actual	
world	as	we	believe	it	to	be	are	less	parsimonious	than	corresponding	
realist	theories.	To	make	this	point,	we	will	continue	to	use	our	“box	
world”	as	a	model	of	the	actual	world.
We	concede	that	our	claim	may	be	surprising	given	the	history	of	
the	debate,	which	often	frames	the	choice	between	the	theories	as	a	
tradeoff	between	ideology	and	ontology.	We	maintain,	however,	that	
this	novelty	issues	from	severe	misinterpretations	of	Quine’s	criterion.	
In	the	course	of	this	paper,	we	set	out	what	we	take	to	be	the	correct	
application	of	Quine’s	 criterion	and	argue	 that	 this	 is	precisely	how	
Quine	himself	views	the	matter.
In	Section	I,	we	locate	the	disagreement	between	the	ostrich	and	
the	 realist	more	precisely.	 In	Section	 II,	we	offer	our	new	argument	
purporting	to	show	that	the	ostrich	has	a	less	parsimonious	ontology	
than	the	realist.	The	argument	rests	on	our	interpretation	of	Quine’s	
criterion.	As	we	understand	this	criterion,	a	theory	has	an	ontological	
commitment	to	things	of	a	sort	just	in	case	it	says	that	there	are	things	
of	that	sort.	(We	use	‘sorts’,	 ‘categories’,	and	‘kinds’	interchangeably.)	
We	mean	by	this	that	a	theory	has	an	ontological	commitment	to,	say,	
dogs	in	virtue	of	including	the	sentence	‘there	are	dogs’.	Yet,	this	theo-
ry	needn’t	have	ontological	commitments	to	any	specific	dogs,	since	it	
invoke	Quine’s	criterion	of	ontological	commitment.	The	ostrich	 fol-
lows	Quine	in	holding	that	an	agent	commits	to	the	ontology	of	the	
theory	she	endorses,	and	that	the	agent	should	endorse	the	best	theory	
available	to	her.	The	theory’s	ontology	is	given	by	what	it	says	there	is:
Quine’s Criterion:	A	 theory	has	an	ontological	commit-
ment	to	Fs	if	and	only	if	it	includes	or	entails	a	sentence	
that	says	that	there	are	Fs.2
According	to	the	ostrich,	the	description	of	the	box	world	given	above	
is	the	best	theory	available.	She	argues	that	this	theory	does	not	en-
tail	that	there	is	an	element	that	the	blue	sphere	and	blue	cone	both	
instantiate.	Thus,	the	ostrich’s	preferred	theory	of	the	world	does	not	
have	an	ontological	commitment	to	universals.	Moreover,	the	ostrich	
argues	that	there	is	no	reason	to	supplement	the	description	of	the	box	
world	given	above	to	produce	a	theory	entailing	that	there	are	univer-
sals.	The	ordinary	description,	argues	the	ostrich,	is	not	explanatorily	
worse	off	than	a	theory	that	also	says	there	are	universals:	additional	
explanatory	 principles	 pressed	 by	 the	 realist	 (such	 as	 truth-maker	
principles)	are	either	illegitimate	or	fail	to	motivate	realism.	
If	the	ostrich	is	correct	that	her	theory	meets	any	legitimate	explan-
atory	burden	that	the	realist’s	theory	does,	then	conventional	wisdom	
says	she	is	in	a	strong	position.	As	Devitt	(1980)	says	in	his	argument	
against	positing	universals	in	response	to	the	one-over-many	problem:	
In	 ontology,	 the	 less	 the	 better.	 Therefore	 the	 realist	
makes	 us	 ontologically	 worse	 off	 without	 explanatory	
gain.	[97–8]
2.	 “We	can	very	easily	involve	ourselves	in	ontological	commitments	by	saying,	
for	example,	that	there	is	something	(bound	variable)	which	red	houses	and	
sunsets	have	in	common;	or	that	there	is	something	which	is	a	prime	number	
larger	than	a	million.	But	this	is,	essentially,	the	only	way	we	can	involve	our-
selves	 in	ontological	commitments:	by	our	use	of	bound	variables”	(Quine	
1953b:	12).	“When	I	inquire	into	the	ontological	commitments	of	a	given	doc-
trine	or	body	of	 theory,	 I	am	merely	asking	what,	according	 to	 that	 theory,	
there	is”	(Quine	1951b:	203–4).
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Type (a) disagreements
Ostrich	nominalists	propose	 to	assess	 the	ontological	 commitments	
of	a	theory	using	Quine’s	criterion:	a	theory	ontologically	commits	to	
what	it	says	there	is.	None	of	the	statements	in	the	description	of	the	
box	world	above	says	that	there	are	universals.	Moreover,	the	ostrich	
denies	 that	 these	 statements	entail	 a	 sentence	 saying	 that	 there	are	
universals.	 Thus,	 according	 to	 the	ostrich,	Quine’s	 criterion	dictates	
that	 these	statements	alone	are	not	sufficient	 to	commit	a	 theory	 in-
cluding	them	to	universals.
Some	realists,	in	arguing	for	the	need	to	posit	universals,	have	de-
parted	from	Quine’s	criterion	by	supposing	that	a	theory	ontologically	
commits	 to	an	entity	 (i. e.,	 a	universal)	 for	every	predicate	deployed	
in	expressing	it.3	Others,	including	(perhaps	most	prominently)	Arm-
strong,	 have	defended	 an	 alternative	 to	Quine’s	 criterion	 known	as	
truth-maker	theory.4	According	to	a	truth-maker	criterion,	a	theory	is	
ontologically	committed	to	the	entities	required	to	make	its	sentences	
true.5	We	will	briefly	address	the	status	of	this	truth-maker	alternative	
3.	 See,	e. g.,	Bergmann	(1952:	430)	and	Russell	(1912:	93–4).
4.	 Schaffer	(2008)	and	Devitt	(2010)	have	both	argued	that	a	truth-maker	crite-
rion	of	ontological	commitment	isn’t	really	an	alternative	to	Quine’s	criterion.	
While	we	are	sympathetic	to	the	arguments	of	these	two	philosophers,	we	
have	reservations	about	fully	committing	to	this	view	here.	Our	reservations	
issue	 in	 large	 part	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 are	 truth-maker	 theorists	who	
obviously	 view	 the	 truth-maker	 criterion	 (perhaps	wrongly)	 as	 a	 genuine	
alternative	to	Quine’s.	Thus,	Armstrong:	“To	postulate	certain	truthmakers	
for	 certain	 truths	 is	 to	 admit	 those	 truthmakers	 into	 one’s	 ontology.	 The	
complete	 range	of	 truthmakers	admitted	constitutes	a	metaphysics	 […].	 I	
think	 that	 proceeding	 by	 looking	 for	 truthmakers	 is	 an	 illuminating	 and	
useful	regimentation	of	the	metaphysical	enterprise	[…].	But	this	raises	the	
question	of	Quine,	and	the	signaling	of	ontological	commitment	by	what	
we	are	prepared	to	‘quantify	over’.	Why	should	we	desert	Quine’s	procedure	
for	some	other	method?	The	great	advantage,	as	I	see	it,	of	the	search	for	
truthmakers	 is	 that	 it	 focuses	us	not	merely	on	 the	metaphysical	 implica-
tions	of	the	subject	terms	but	also	on	their	predicates,”	(2004:	23).
5.	 Armstrong	(1997:	113–16;	2004)	further	develops	the	notion	of	a	truth-maker.	
See	also	Heil	(2003),	and	Cameron	(2008:	4)	for	defenses	of	truth-maker	cri-
teria	of	ontological	commitment.
need	not	entail	sentences	that	say	there	are	any	specific	dogs.	It	need	
not	 say,	 for	 instance,	 that	 Fido	 or	 Rover	 exists.	 Similarly,	 a	 theory	
may	have	 an	 ontological	 commitment	 to	 each	 particular	 dog	with-
out	having	an	ontological	commitment	to	dogs.	This	would	happen	
if	the	theory	says	or	entails	of	each	dog	(Fido,	Rover,	and	so	on)	that	
it	exists,	but	fails	to	say	or	entail	that	they	are	dogs.	Importantly,	in	
speaking	of	the	sentence	‘there	are	dogs’	as	generating	an	ontologi-
cal	commitment	to	things	of	the	sort	dogs	we	don’t	mean	to	reify	sorts	
in	 a	way	 that	would	 prejudge	 the	 debate.	We	 use	 this	 vocabulary	
solely	to	simplify	discussion	by	marking	the	distinction	between	an	
ontological	commitment	to	dogs	in	general	and	ontological	commit-
ments	to	some	specific	dogs.	The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	devoted	
to	defending	the	argument	from	Section	II	—	and,	 in	particular,	our	
interpretation	of	Quine’s	criterion.
I.
The	ostrich	and	realist	disagree	about	whether	to	endorse	a	theory	
that	ontologically	commits	to	universals.	One’s	theory	can	be	divided	
into	the	set	of	sentences	that	one	endorses	and	their	 logical	conse-
quences.	This	suggests	that	an	ostrich	and	a	realist	may	disagree	at	
one	of	 three	places:	 (a)	 they	may	 agree	 about	which	 theory	 to	 en-
dorse	but	disagree	about	how	to	assess	the	ontological	commitments	
of	 this	 theory;	 (b)	 they	may	 disagree	 about	whether	 to	 endorse	 a	
given	 sentence	or	a	 set	of	 sentences;	or,	 (c)	 they	may	agree	about	
whether	to	endorse	a	set	of	sentences	but	disagree	about	the	logical	
consequences	of	these	sentences.	Disputes	between	nominalists	and	
realists	have,	in	fact,	taken	all	three	forms.
We	will	 briefly	 survey	 these	disputes	 as	 they	pertain	 to	 the	de-
scription	of	the	box	world.	The	ostrich	and	the	realist	agree	that	this	
description	 is	fitting.	Yet	 they	disagree	about	whether	 this	 should	
lead	them	to	posit	universals.	We	will	suggest	that,	from	a	Quinean	
perspective,	the	most	important	disagreements	between	the	ostrich	
and	 the	realist	concerning	 the	description	of	 the	box	world	are	of	
type	(c).
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commits	to	red	surfaces,	since	the	sentence	entails	that	there	are	red	
surfaces.	On	 the	other	hand,	 one	who	 endorses	 ‘Surface	 S	 is	 green’	
ontologically	commits	to	green	surfaces.	Thus,	the	two	theories	have	
different	 ontological	 commitments,	 or	 require	 different	 ontological	
grounds.	One	who	endorses	‘Surface	S	is	red’	posits	something	in	the	
world	that	is	different	from	that	which	is	posited	by	one	who	endorses	
‘Surface	S	is	green’.
In	sum,	the	Quinean	about	ontological	commitment	specifies	the	
ontological	commitments	of	the	statement	using	the	very	predicates	
that	 follow	 ‘there	 are’.	 So,	 predicates	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	ontological	
commitments	of	 a	 statement.	We	will	 develop	 this	point	more	 fully	
when	we	compare	the	realist’s	and	nominalist’s	theories	with	respect	
to	their	ontological	parsimony.7
Type (b) disagreements
Many	realists	attempt	to	argue	for	the	existence	of	universals	by	posit-
ing	substantive	(or	even	purportedly	trivial)	principles	of	explanation.	
For	instance,	some	realists	endorse	principles,	such	as	the	following:	if	
a	is	green,	then	a	is	something	(namely,	green).8	Other	realists	explicitly	
endorse	truth-making	principles	that	in	conjunction	with	the	ordinary	
description	provided	above	entail	that	there	are	universals.	Ostriches	of-
fer	a	variety	of	responses	to	these	arguments.	Some	simply	deny	that	the	
relevant	principles	are	true.9	Others	accept	the	principles	but	deny	that	
7.	 We	have	framed	Quine’s	criterion	in	terms	of	what	a	theory	says	or	entails	
there	is.	Sometimes	Quine	frames	the	criterion	in	terms	of	what	must	exist	in	
order	for	the	theory	to	be	true.	We	maintain	that	this	modal	formulation	of	
the	criterion	has	the	same	consequences	as	the	formulation	in	terms	of	‘says	
that’.	As	before,	 the	 truth	of	 a	 theory	may	necessarily	entail	 that	 there	are	
Fs	without	necessarily	entailing	that	there	are	any	specific	Fs.	A	theory	that	
says	that	there	are	green	things	cannot	be	true	unless	there	are	green	things.	
Moreover,	in	our	view,	Quine	uses	‘must’	in	this	context,	as	he	does	in	others,	
to	mean	logical	entailment.	So	 ‘what	must	exist	 if	…’	 just	means	 ‘what	 the	
theory	 entails	 exists’.	 In	 particular,	 it	 cannot	 be	 interpreted	 to	mean	 ‘meta-
physically	necessary’.	Burgess	and	Rosen	(1999:	226)	make	a	similar	point.
8.	 See,	e. g.,	Schiffer	(1996).
9.	 Devitt	(1980)	rejects	principles	of	both	sorts.	
to	Quine’s	criterion,	since	appeals	 to	 it	have	been	such	a	prominent	
feature	of	arguments	against	ostrich	nominalism.
According	 to	 Armstrong,	 a	 truth-maker	 criterion	 of	 ontological	
commitment	delivers	different	results	from	the	Quinean	criterion.	In	
particular,	Armstrong	says	that	for	Quine	“predicates	do	not	have	to	be	
taken	seriously	in	considering	the	ontological	implications	of	the	state-
ments	one	takes	to	be	true”	(Armstrong	1989:	89).	We	take	ontological	
implications	to	be	ontological	commitments,	since	Armstrong	says	that	
he	is	comparing	truth-maker	theory	to	Quine’s	criterion	of	ontological	
commitment.6	That	is,	we	take	the	ontological	implications	of	a	state-
ment	to	be	the	ontology	that	one	endorses	if	one	takes	that	statement	
to	be	true.	To	illustrate	his	statement,	Armstrong	says	that	truth-maker	
theory	requires	an	ontological	ground	(what	Armstrong	calls	“a	differ-
ence	in	the	word”),	which	accounts	for	the	difference	between,	e. g.,	the	
case	in	which	‘red’	applies	to	a	surface	and	the	case	in	which	‘green’	ap-
plies	to	it.	We	take	this	to	mean	that	the	truth-maker	theorist	supposes	
that	if	person	A	endorses	the	statement	‘Surface	S	is	red’,	and	person	B	
endorses	the	statement	‘Surface	S	is	green’,	then	person	A	and	person	
B	suppose	that	there	are	different	things	in	the	world.	In	other	words,	
their	theories	posit or	ontologically commit to	different	things.	Armstrong	
seems	to	 think	 that	 the	proponent	of	Quine’s	criterion	doesn’t	agree	
with	this:	she	thinks,	according	to	Armstrong,	that	person	A	and	per-
son	B	do	not	suppose	that	there	are	different	things	in	the	world.	And	
if	the	two	do	not	suppose	that	there	are	different	things	in	the	world,	
then	it	seems	that	they	have	the	same	ontological	commitments.	
At	this	point	we	want	to	sound	a	note	of	protest.	Quine’s	criterion	
assigns	a	great	deal	of	importance	to	predicates	in	the	assessment	of	
ontological	commitment.	Returning	to	Armstrong’s	example,	even	the	
Quinean	concedes	that	‘There	are	red	surfaces’	and	‘There	are	green	
surfaces’	require	different	things	to	be	in	the	world	in	order	for	either	
to	be	true.	The	former	requires	red	surfaces;	the	latter	requires	green	
surfaces.	Similarly,	one	who	endorses	‘Surface	S	is	red’	ontologically	
6.	 Armstrong	(2004)	is	quite	explicit	about	this	in	the	quote	cited	in	our	foot-
note	4	above.
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the	ordinary	description	entails	that	there	are	universals.	The	ostrich	
denies	this.	We	now	turn	to	developing	the	realist’s	and	ostrich’s	pro-
posed	regimentations.	 In	 the	next	section	we	compare	their	relative	
parsimony	in	order	to	argue	that	the	realist’s	proposed	regimentation	
results	in	a	better	theory	than	the	ostrich’s	proposed	regimentation.
The	ostrich	denies	that	one	can	infer	that	there	is	a	universal,	blue, 
from	 the	 sentence	 ‘there	 is	 a	 blue	 sphere’.	 The	 expression	 ‘blue’	 in	
this	statement	 is	not	accessible	to	quantification.	This	suggests	that	
the	ostrich	thinks	that	the	best	regimented	theory	arising	out	of	the	
description	of	the	box	world	can	be	axiomatized	by	combining	some	
basic	principles	with	the	following	sentences:
∃x	(Blue(x)	∧	Sphere(x))	 	∃x	(Green(x)	∧	Cube(x))
∃x	(Orange(x)	∧	Sphere(x))	∃x	(Blue(x)	∧	Cone(x))
In	 these	 sentences,	expressions	 such	as	 ‘Blue(…)’	occur	as	monadic	
predicates.	 They	 are	 inaccessible	 to	 quantification	 in	 standard	 first-
order	 logic.	This	means	that	there	is	no	sense	in	which	the	ostrich’s	
theory	entails	that	there	is	a	universal,	blue,	that	the	sphere	has.
A	 realist	 of	 the	 kind	under	 consideration	believes	 that	 it	 follows	
from	 the	description	of	 the	 box	world	 that	 there	 is	 such	 a	 thing	 as	
the	universal	blue.	Moreover,	she	believes	that	this	entailment	follows	
without	 additional	 substantive	 principles.	 Consequently,	 our	 real-
ist	believes	that	‘blue’	is	accessible	to	quantification	in	the	sentences	
comprising	the	description.	This	suggests	that,	in	her	view,	these	sen-
tences	are	best	regimented	as	follows:
∃x	(IS(x, blue)	∧	IS(x, spherical))
∃x	(IS(x, green)	∧	IS(x, cubical))
∃x	(IS(x, orange)	∧	IS(x, spherical))
∃x	(IS(x, blue)	∧	IS(x, conical))
they	have	the	entailments	claimed	by	the	realist.10	Rather	than	entering	
debates	over	these	issues,	we	are	going	to	present	a	novel	objection	to	
ostrich	nominalism	that	doesn’t	rely	on	these	substantive	principles.
Type (c) disagreements
Some	 realists	would	 claim	 that	 the	ordinary	description	of	 the	box	
world	(properly	spelled	out)	simply	entails	that	there	are	universals.	
Ostriches	 deny	 this.	 When	 disagreements	 over	 entailments	 arise,	
Quinean	methodology	 dictates	 that	 a	 theory	 stated	 in	 ordinary	 (or	
even	scientific)	language	should	be	replaced	by	—	that	is,	regimented 
into	—	a	notation	that	makes	entailments	perspicuous.11	The	resulting	
sentences	 need	not	 uncover	 the	 “hidden	meaning”	 of	 the	 originals,	
but	should	constitute	the	best	 theory	that	captures	what	 is	scientifi-
cally	respectable	in	the	original	notation.12	Essentially,	disagreements	
of	 type	 (c)	 (disagreements	over	which	 inferences	 are	 valid)	 should	
be	 converted	 into	 disagreements	 of	 type	 (b)	 (disagreements	 over	
which	sentences	to	endorse).	Given	this	methodological	principle,	dis-
agreements	of	the	sort	that	occur	between	the	realist	and	the	ostrich	
nominalist	 become	disagreements	 over	which	 regimented	 theory	 to	
adopt.	The	realist	thinks	that	the	best	regimented	theory	arising	from	
10.	 Sellars	(1962)	and	Van	Cleve	(1994)	deny	that	from	the	claim	that	a	is	F	and	
the	principle	that	if	a	is	F,	then	a	is	something,	one	can	infer	that	there	is	some-
thing	which	a	instantiates.	Some	philosophers	accept	truthmaker	principles	
but	deny	that	they,	combined	with	the	observed	facts,	entail	 that	there	are	
universals.	 For	 discussions,	 see	 Parsons	 (1999),	 Lewis	 (2003),	 Lewis	 and	
Rosen	(2003),	MacBride	(2005),	and	Melia	(2005).	
11.	 In	particular,	 theories	are	to	be	regimented	into	the	 language	of	first-order	
logic;	the	relevant	notion	of	entailment	is	first-order	entailment.
12.	 The	goal	of	regimentation	is	to	construct	a	new theory	that	fulfills	the	func-
tion	of	an	old	theory	but	clarifies	it	in	certain	respects.	As	Quine	says,	“we	do	
not	claim	to	make	clear	and	explicit	what	the	users	of	the	unclear	expression	
had	unconsciously	 in	mind	all	 along.	We	do	not	expose	hidden	meanings,	
as	the	words	‘analysis’	and	‘explication’	would	suggest;	we	supply	lacks.	We	
fix	on	the	particular	functions	of	the	unclear	expression	that	make	it	worth	
troubling	about,	and	then	devise	a	substitute,	clear	and	couched	in	terms	to	
our	 liking,	 that	fills	 those	 functions”	 (1960:	258–9).	Different	proposals	 for	
regimenting	a	theory	just are	different	theories.
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claim	that	her	theory	has	fewer	ontological	commitments.	She	claims	
that	the	realist’s	theory	shares	all	of	the	ontological	commitments	of	her	
theory	but	 is,	 in	addition,	committed	 to	universals.	Thus,	 the	 realist’s	
theory	purportedly	has	a	greater	number	of	ontological	commitments	
than	the	ostrich’s.	We	believe	that	this	assessment	is	wrong	and	that	re-
alism	has	a	more	parsimonious	ontology	than	ostrich	nominalism	does.	
According	to	Quine’s	criterion,	ontological	commitments	arise	from	
existential	sentences.	Each	theory	entails	a	large	number	of	existential	
sentences.	Indeed,	certain	natural	supplements	to	either	theory	of	the	
box	world	(such	as	that	there	are	only	four	objects	in	the	box)	will	re-
sult	in	infinitely	many	existential	entailments	that	are	neither	logically	
nor	necessarily	equivalent.15	Presumably,	one	can	compare	the	onto-
logical	parsimony	of	these	two	theories	without	taking	into	account	all	
of	their	existential	entailments.	Therefore,	we	restrict	our	attention	to	
a	subset	of	existential	entailments	of	each	theory,	which	both	the	real-
ist	and	ostrich	will	agree	generate	all	of	the	ontological	commitments	
relevant	to	comparing	the	ontological	parsimony	of	their	theories.	We	
will	offer	a	more	theoretical	motivation	 for	 this	choice	of	existential	
sentences	in	Section	VII.
The	ostrich	will	agree	that	her	theory	has	the	following	existential	
entailments	 and	 that	 these	 entailments	 generate	 all	 of	 the	 ontologi-
cal	commitments	relevant	to	comparing	the	relative	parsimony	of	her	
theory	with	that	of	the	realist.16 
∃x	Blue(x)		 ∃x	Sphere(x)	 ∃x	Green(x)
∃x	Cube(x)	 ∃x	Orange(x)	 ∃x	Cone(x)
What	 commitments	 do	 these	 sentences	 generate	 for	 the	 ostrich’s	
theory?	By	Quine’s	criterion	of	ontological	commitment,	the	ostrich’s	
15.	 See	our	footnote	27.
16.	 This	is	not	to	say	that	the	ostrich’s	entire	theory	can	be	reconstructed	from	
these	existential	sentences.	All	 that	we	are	claiming	is	 that	 the	ostrich	will	
point	to	these	as	sufficient	to	determine	the	relative	ontological	parsimony	of	
her	theory.	See,	for	example,	the	quote	from	Parsons	(1999)	in	Section	III.	
In	this	regimented	theory,	‘IS(…,…)’	occurs	as	a	dyadic	predicate	and	
means	roughly	“instantiates”.	This	expression	is	inaccessible	to	quanti-
fication	in	the	realist’s	theory.	By	way	of	contrast,	expressions	such	as	
‘blue’	and	‘spherical’	occur	as	names	in	the	realist’s	theory	and	are	thus	
accessible	to	quantification.13	This	means	that	the	realist’s	 theory	en-
tails	that	there	are	universals	such	as	blue	that	the	sphere	instantiates.	
In	order	to	fully	secure	this	entailment,	the	realist	needs	two	supple-
mentary	principles	 linking	being	instantiated	with	being	a	universal,	
and	being	a	particular	with	the	failure	to	be	instantiated:
Universal: ∀x	(Universal(x)	iff	∃y	IS(y, x))
Particular: ∀x	(Particular(x)	iff	¬∃y	IS(y, x))
In	the	statement	of	these	principles,	the	realist	makes	use	of	two	ad-
ditional	monadic	predicates,	‘Universal(…)’	and	‘Particular(…)’.	These	
expressions	are	inaccessible	to	quantification,	just	as	expressions	such	
as	‘Blue(…)’	are	in	the	ostrich’s	theory.	We	note	in	passing	that	some	
philosophers	might	 treat	 these	 as	 definitions	 rather	 than	 principles,	
but	for	the	sake	of	argument	we	will	treat	‘Universal(…)’	and	‘Particu-
lar(…)’	as	primitives.14
II.
Now	 for	 the	 crucial	question:	which	of	 these	 regimented	 theories	 is	
better?	Above,	we	mentioned	that	Devitt	argues	that	the	ostrich	nomi-
nalist’s	 theory	 is	 to	be	preferred	on	 the	grounds	 that	 it	 is	more	parsi-
monious.	The	ostrich’s	claim	to	ontological	parsimony	derives	from	the	
13.	 It	is	open	to	the	realist	to	develop	a	theory	on	which	these	expressions	are	
replaced	by	definite	descriptions.	These	descriptions	may	be	purely	qualita-
tive	if	we	assume	that	there	are	no	indiscernible	universals.	Or	the	realist	may	
replace	the	names	with	individualized	descriptions	in	the	manner	of	Quine’s	
‘pegasizes’	(1953b:	8).
14.	 We	are	 agnostic	 about	whether	particulars	or	universals	 are	 essentially	 so.	
Moreover,	we	take	no	stand	about	whether	particulars	are	essentially	unin-
stantiated.	For	discussion	of	the	modal	status	of	these	theses,	see	MacBride	
(1999;	2005b).
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Counting Principle 2  
(1)–(6)	 and	 (1*)–(4*)	 are	 the	 only	 ontological	 commit-
ments	of	the	respective	theories	relevant	to	determining	
which	is	more	parsimonious.
Counting Principle 3  
One	determines	which	of	two	theories	is	more	ontologi-
cally	parsimonious	by	counting	their	respective	ontologi-
cal	commitments.
In	what	follows,	we	defend	each	of	these	counting	principles.
In	light	of	the	current	state	of	the	debate,	Counting	Principle	1	will	
likely	be	viewed	as	the	most	controversial.	The	ostrich	will	protest	that	
it	turns	out	that	all	of	the	blue	things	are	either	spheres	or	cones.	So	
her	 theory’s	 ontological	 commitment	 to	 blue	 things,	 the	 ostrich	 ar-
gues,	is	not	in	fact	distinct	from	its	ontological	commitment	to	spheres	
and	its	commitment	to	cones.	We	will	argue	that	these	commitments	
are	 distinct	—	that	 according	 to	Quine’s	 criterion,	 a	 theory’s	 ontologi-
cal	 commitment	 to	 things of a given sort	 (blue	 things)	 is	distinct	 from	
its	commitments	to	specific	objects	(the	specific	cone	and	the	specific	
sphere)	even	if	the	objects	happen	to	fall	under	that	sort.	We	will	spend	
a	 substantial	portion	of	 this	paper	defending	 this	 claim,	and	anyone	
who	understands	this	defense	will	understand	the	gist	of	our	argument.	
Counting	Principles	2	and	3	might	be	viewed	as	less	controversial	
than	Counting	Principle	1.	However,	in	the	final	sections	of	this	paper,	
we’ll	discuss	a	difficulty	with	assessing	parsimony	by	simply	counting	
the	theory’s	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	a	sort.	This	difficulty	
will	lead	us	to	argue	that	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	explan-
atorily basic	 sorts	weigh	more	heavily	 in	 the	assessment	of	ontologi-
cal	parsimony	than	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	other	sorts.	
Thus,	we	will	amend	Counting	Principles	2	and	3	as	follows:
Counting Principle 2*  
(1)–(6)	 and	 (1*)–(4*)	 are	 the	 only	 ontological	
theory	has	(1)	an	ontological	commitment	to	blue things,	(2)	an	onto-
logical	commitment	to	spheres,	(3)	an	ontological	commitment	to	green 
things,	(4)	an	ontological	commitment	to	cubes,	(5)	an	ontological	com-
mitment	to	orange things,	and	(6)	an	ontological	commitment	to	cones.
What	about	the	realist’s	theory?	The	ostrich	will	agree	that	the	real-
ist’s	theory	has	the	following	existential	entailments:
∃x∃y	IS(x, y)	 ∃x∃y	IS(y, x)
∃x	Universal(x)	 ∃x	Particular(x)
She	will	also	agree	that	these	entailments	generate	all	of	 the	ontologi-
cal	commitments	 relevant	 to	comparing	 the	 relative	parsimony	of	 the	
realist’s	 theory	with	 that	of	her	own.	By	Quine’s	criterion,	 the	 realist’s	
theory	has	(1*)	an	ontological	commitment	to	instantiating things,	(2*)	an	
ontological	commitment	to	 instantiated things,	(3*)	an	ontological	com-
mitment	to	universals,	and	(4*)	an	ontological	commitment	to	particulars.
Comparing	the	commitments	of	the	ostrich’s	and	realist’s	theories,	
we	find	ourselves	perplexed	by	the	ostrich’s	claim	that	her	theory	has	
a	more	parsimonious	ontology	than	the	realist’s	does.	Counting	onto-
logical	commitments	naïvely,	ostrich	nominalism	looks	to	have	a	less 
parsimonious	ontology	than	does	realism.	By	our	count,	the	ostrich’s	
theory	has six	ontological	commitments.	By	way	of	contrast,	we	count	
the	 realist’s	 theory	 as	 having	 four	 ontological	 commitments.	 Six	 is	
greater	than	four.	Therefore,	the	ostrich’s	theory	is	less	parsimonious	
than	the	realist’s.	
There	are	a	number	of	places	at	which	our	naïve	assessment	of	the	
relative	 parsimony	 of	 realism	 in	 comparison	 to	 ostrich	 nominalism	
will	 be	 challenged.	These	 challenges	 can	best	be	 addressed	by	enu-
merating	the	principles	by	which	are	counting:
Counting Principle 1 
The	ontological	commitments	listed	in	(1)–(6)	are	all	
distinct	from	each	other,	as	are	the	ontological	commit-
ments	listed	in	(1*)–(4*).
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we	 suppose	 that	 (3)	 the	ontological	 commitment	 to	 green	 things	 is	
distinct	from	(4)	the	ontological	commitment	to	cubes.	
The	ostrich’s	way	of	 thinking	 about	 ontological	 commitment	 vali-
dates	the	following	two	inferences,	which	we	will	argue	are	problematic:
	(I-1)	Theory	T	has	an	ontological	commitment	to	Fs.	Therefore,	
there	are	some	Fs	to	which	it	is	ontologically	committed.	
(I-2)	All	Fs	are	Gs.	Therefore,	in	saying	that	there	are	Fs,	a	theory	
incurs	no	ontological	commitments	beyond	those	it	incurs	
in	saying	that	there	are	Gs.
That	the	ostrich	reasons	in	accordance	with	these	principles	is	reflected	
in	Armstrong’s	claim	above,	which	is	echoed	by	Josh	Parsons	in	defense	
of	 ostrich	 nominalism:	 “[A]ccording	 to	 Quine’s	 criterion	 of	 ontologi-
cal	commitment,	to	say	‘There	is	a	red	surface’	commits	us	to	no	more	
things	than	‘There	is	a	surface’	commits	us	to”	(Parsons	1999:	327).	As	
Parsons	understands	Quine’s	criterion,	a	theory,	T
1
,	that	says	there	are	
red	surfaces	does	not	have	any	ontological	commitments	beyond	those	
of	a	theory,	T
2
,	that	says	there	are	surfaces.	The	idea	is	that	when	one	
ontologically	commits	to	surfaces,	one’s	theory	thereby	includes	in	its	
ontology	all	of	the	things	that	turn	out	to	be	surfaces.	So	the	theory	does	
not	gain	any	additional	ontology	if	it	also	includes	the	claim	‘There	are	
red	surfaces’.	This	form	of	reasoning	generalizes	to	(I-2).
By	way	of	contrast,	we	endorse	Counting	Principle	1	because	we	
believe	(i)	that	a	theory’s	ontological	commitment	to	things	of	a	given	
sort	 is	distinct	 from	its	potential	commitments	to	the	specific	things	
that	happen	to	fall	under	that	sort,	and	(ii)	that	if	one	can	ontologically	
commit	 to	Fs	without	ontologically	 committing	 to	Gs,	 then	an	onto-
logical	commitment	to	Fs	is	distinct	from	an	ontological	commitment	
to	Gs.	From	(i)	 it	 follows	 that	a	 theory’s	 commitments	 to	 red	 things,	
green	things,	cubes,	and	so	on	are	different	from	its	commitments	to	
the	specific	things	that	happen	to	be	red,	green,	cubes,	and	so	on.	As	
a	 result,	 one	 could	have	 any	of	 these	 commitments	without	having	
the	others.	Thus,	from	(ii),	an	ontological	commitment	to	green	things	
commitments	to	things	of	explanatorily	basic	sorts	of	the	
respective	theories.
Counting Principle 3*  
A	theory	with	many	ontological	commitments	 to	 things	
of	 explanatorily	 basic	 sorts	 is	 less	 parsimonious	 than	 a	
theory	with	few	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	ex-
planatorily	basic	sorts.17
III.
In	 this	 section,	we	 defend	Counting	 Principle	 1.	 Specifically,	we	 de-
fend	the	claim	that	the	ontological	commitments	listed	as	(1)–(6)	are	
distinct,	and	that,	consequently,	the	ostrich	has	at	least	six	ontological	
commitments.	The	contrasting	view,	defended	by	the	ostrich,	 is	that	
she	has	only	four	ontological	commitments.	According	to	the	ostrich,	
her	 ontology	 includes	 only	 the	 following:	 a	 cone,	 a	 cube,	 and	 two	
spheres.	If	the	ostrich	is	right,	not	all	of	the	commitments	listed	in	(1)–
(6)	are	distinct,	and	Counting	Principle	1	is	a	form	of	double-counting.
It	is	important	to	understand	the	ostrich’s	position	and	to	see	why	it	
is	wrong.	As	the	ostrich	understands	the	Quinean	conception	of	ontol-
ogy,	an	ontological	commitment	to	green	things	just	is	an	ontological	
commitment	 to	 the	 specific	 things	 that	 turn	out	 to	be	green.	There-
fore,	since	all	of	the	green	things	in	the	box	turned	out	to	be	cubes,	a	
theory	that	says	that	there	are	green	things	carries	no	commitments	
beyond	those	of	a	theory	that	says	only	that	there	are	cubes.	So	the	
ostrich	 charges	 us	with	 double-counting	 her	 commitments	 because	
17.	 We	don’t	want	to	commit	to	the	view	that	ontological	commitments	to	things	
of	explanatorily	non-basic	sorts	carry	no	weight	in	the	assessment	of	ontolog-
ical	parsimony.	Rather,	our	view	is	that	one	assesses	the	relative	parsimony	
of	two	theories	by	determining	which	has	more	ontological	commitments	to	
things	of	explanatorily	basic	sorts.	If	the	two	theories	have	the	same	number	
of	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	explanatorily	basic	sorts,	one	then	
compares	the	theories’	respective	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	ex-
planatorily	non-basic	sorts.
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	The	failure	of	(I-2)	is	more	relevant	to	our	criticism	of	ostrich	nomi-
nalism.	Parsons	seems	to	invoke	(I-2)	to	argue	that	theory	T
1
	has	no	
more	ontological	commitments	than	theory	T
2
	despite	the	fact	that	T
1
 
says	that	there	are	red	surfaces	and	T
2
	does	not.	We	believe	that	this	
inference	is	invalid	for	reasons	Quine	explicitly	cites	in	support	of	his	
criterion	of	ontological	commitment.
The	problem	with	Parsons’s	way	of	thinking	can	be	shown	using	his	
own	example.	By	Quine’s	criterion,	T
1
	is	ontologically	committed	to	red 
surfaces	(because	it	says	that	there	are	some),	whereas	T
2
	is	not	commit-
ted	to	red surfaces	(because	it	doesn’t	say	that	there	are	any).	Thus,	T
1
	has	
an	ontological	commitment	that	T
2	
lacks,	even	if	they	agree	on	which	
specific	surfaces	there	are.	So,	a	theory’s	commitment	to	red	surfaces	in	
general	cannot	be	identified	with	its	commitments	to	specific	red	sur-
faces	(or,	for	that	matter,	its	commitments	to	some	specific	surfaces).
This	point	can	be	generalized.	The	ostrich	thinks	of	a	theory’s	onto-
logical	commitment	to	Fs	as	a	commitment	to	all	of	the	specific	things	
that	turn	out	to	be	F.	Thus,	if	all	objects	fall	under	some	predicate	‘F’,	
then	 any	 two	 theories	 that	 say	 that	 there	 are	Fs	 share	 their	 ontolo-
gies.	Consider	ostrich	nominalism	and	realism.	Both	of	these	theories	
agree	that	there	are	self-identical things,	so	they	ontologically	commit	
to	self-identical	things. As	a	matter	of	fact,	everything	falls	under	the	
predicate	 ‘is	a	self-identical	thing’.	So	on	the	ostrich’s	understanding,	
any	theory	that	commits	to	self-identical	things	commits	to	all	of	the	
specific	things	that	happen	to	be	self-identical.	Thus,	 the	realist	and	
ostrich	are	committed	to	 the	same	specific	 things.	But	since	specific	
things	exhaust	each	theory’s	ontology,	the	realist	and	ostrich	have	the	
exact	 same	 commitments!	Certainly	 this	 line	of	 reasoning	 is	wrong.	
The	realist	and	ostrich	have	different	ontologies.	So	any	understand-
ing	of	Quine’s	criterion	that	says	otherwise	is	mistaken.	
Quine	(1953b:	1)	offers	a	similar	reason	for	rejecting	(I-2).	He	notes	
that	 everyone	will	 accept	 ‘Everything’	 as	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 question	
‘What	is	there?’.	But	surely	this	doesn’t	entail	that	every	theory	has	the	
same	ontology.	The	interesting	ontological	disagreements	concern	cas-
es	—	namely,	whether	there	are	such	things	as	gods,	universals,	minds,	
differs	from	an	ontological	commitment	to	cubes,	even	if	all	and	only	
the	green	things	are	cubes	(as	is	the	case	in	the	box	world).	We	believe	
that	there	are	decisive	reasons	for	anyone	who	endorses	Quine’s	crite-
rion	to	agree	with	us	about	(i)	and	(ii).
Our	argument	for	(i)	assumes	that	Quine’s	criterion	is	correct	and	
demonstrates	that	(I-1)	and	(I-2)	are	false.	The	failure	of	(I-1)	and	(I-2)	
implies	 that	 the	ostrich’s	way	of	 thinking	about	ontological	 commit-
ment	is	wrong,	and	that,	consequently,	we	should	think	of	a	theory’s	
ontology	as	including	the	things	of	various	sorts	that	it	says	there	are.	
The	 substance	 of	 our	 argument	will	 substantially	mimic	Quine’s	 in	
“On	What	There	Is”	as	we	understand	it,	though	the	argument	is	inde-
pendent	of	exegetical	considerations.
(I-1)	is	problematic	because	it	entails	that	we	can	never	criticize	our	
opponents	 for	having	 too	many	ontological	 commitments.	 If	 (I-1)	 is	
correct,	a	theory’s	ontological	commitments	include	only	things	that	
exist.	For	example,	the	ostrich	might	complain	that	the	realist’s	theory	
is	profligate	because	it	has	an	ontological	commitment	to	universals.	
But	(I-1)	precludes	her	from	doing	so.	Once	the	ostrich	says	that	the	re-
alist	theory	commits	to	universals,	(I-1)	requires	the	ostrich	to	concede	
that	there	are	universals.	As	Quine	(1953:	1–3)	says	in	discussing	the	
tangle	of	problems	he	calls	Plato’s	Beard,	when	the	party	saying	that	
there	are	fewer	things	tries	to	“formulate	[her]	difference	of	opinion”	
she	seems	“to	be	in	a	predicament”.	She	“cannot	admit	that	there	are	
some	things	which	[her	opponent]	countenances	but	[she	does]	not”.
Quine’s	 criterion,	 as	we	understand	 it,	 is	 specifically	designed	 to	
avoid	this	consequence.	It	says	that	a	theory	ontologically	commits	to	
Fs	just	in	case	it	says	that	there	are	Fs.	Starting	with	the	premise	that	
a	theory	can	say	that	there	are	Fs	even	if	there	aren’t	any,	it	immedi-
ately	follows	that	one	can	ontologically	commit	to	Fs	even	if	there	are	
no	Fs.	There	are	no,	 say,	unicorns,	but	 some	 theories	say	 that	 there	
are	 unicorns.	 It	would	 be	 odd	 indeed	 (particularly	 from	 a	Quinean	
perspective)	to	claim	that	such	theories	are	not	ontologically	commit-
ted	to	unicorns.	For	this	reason,	we	believe	that	any	understanding	of	
Quine’s	criterion	that	validates	(I-1)	is	incorrect.
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a	theory	with	the	class	of	all	things	to	which	the	theory	
is	ontically	committed.	This	is	not	my	intention.	The	on-
tology	is	the	range	of	the	variables.	Each	of	the	various	
interpretations	of	the	range	(while	keeping	the	interpre-
tations	of	predicates	fixed)	might	be	compatible	with	the	
theory.	But	the	theory	is	ontically	committed	to	an	object	
only	 if	 that	object	 is	 common	to	all	 those	 ranges.	And	
the	theory	is	ontically	committed	to	‘objects	of	such	and	
such	 kind’,	 say	dogs,	 just	 in	 case	 each	of	 those	 ranges	
contains	some	dog	or	other.	[Quine	1969b:	315]
This	 is	 also	 how	many	 of	Quine’s	 early	 expositors	 understood	 him.	
Church	—	echoing	 a	 point	 made	 in	 several	 places	 by	 Quine	 him-
self19	—	cites	as	an	advantage	of	Quine’s	criterion	that	it	does	mark	the	
distinction	between	a	commitment	to	things	of	a	sort	and	a	commit-
ment	 to	 specific	 things	 that	 fall	 under	 that	 sort:	 “[I]f	 an	ontological	
issue	concerns	the	existence,	not	of	some	particular	entity,	but	of	enti-
ties	of	a	certain	category,	then	the	criterion	of	ontological	commitment	
which	has	reference	to	the	use	of	a	variable	is	more	direct,	and	may	
take	precedence	over	the	criterion	which	has	reference	to	the	use	of	a	
name”	(1958:	1009).	From	the	fact	that	Quine	thinks	one	ontologically	
commits	not	merely	to	things,	but	to	things	of	a	given	sort,	it	follows	
straightforwardly	that,	on his own view,	a	theory	that	says	that	there	are	
green	things	has	an	ontological	commitment	to	green things	—	and	not	
merely	to	specific	things	that	are	green.	On	the	other	hand,	a	theory	
19.	 A	related	point	is	made	by	Stevenson	(1976),	who	points	to	(Quine	1953b:	13;	
1953c:	103;	1969a:	96–7).	It	follows	from	the	fact	that	an	ontological	commit-
ment	to	green	things	is	not	a	relation	to	specific	green	things	that	ontological	
commitment	 is	an	 intensional	 relation.	This	 intensionality	was	noticed	by	
Church	(1958:	1012–14	(footnote	3)).	Church	illustrates	this	claim	by	citing	
the	fact	that	an	ontological	commitment	to	unicorns	is	not	the	same	as	an	on-
tological	commitment	to	purple	cows.	For	a	discussion	of	the	function	of	bare	
plural	expressions	such	as	‘lions’,	see	Carlson	and	Pelletier	(1995).	For	reasons	
that	we	will	discuss	below,	we	 reject	as	misunderstandings	arguments	 that	
infer	from	Quine’s	general	extensionalism	that	he	takes	ontological	commit-
ment	to	be	an	extensional	notion	(see	discussions	in	Cartwright	1954,	Chihara	
1968,	and	Brogard	2008).
or	material	objects.	A	theory’s	ontological	commitments	should	reflect	
its	stance	on	these	matters.	For	example,	a	theory	that	says	there	are	
self-identical	things	need	not	be	committed	to	green	things,	even	if	it	
turns	out	that	green	things	are	among	the	self-identical	things.	To	ac-
cept	this,	however,	is	to	reject	(I-2).	
Our	argument	for	(ii)	from	above	relies	on	considerations	already	
raised.	Observe	that	a	theory’s	ontological	commitment	to	Fs	is	gener-
ated	by	the	fact	that	 it	entails	the	sentence	 ‘There	are	Fs’.	A	theory’s	
ontological	commitment	to Gs	is	not	generated	by	this	entailment,	but	
rather	is	generated	by	the	fact	that	it	entails	‘There	are	Gs’.	One	could	
have	either	of	these	entailments	without	having	the	other.	Thus,	a	theo-
ry	could	have	either	of	these	ontological	commitments	without	having	
the	other.	So,	by	Leibniz’s	Law,	the	commitments	must	be	distinct.18	For	
example,	a	theorist	who	asserts	the	existence	of	green things	has	an	on-
tological	commitment	to	green things.	However,	unless	she	also	asserts	
that	there	are	cubes,	she	does	not	have	an	ontological	commitment	to	
cubes.	Indeed,	asserting	the	existence	of	green	things	is	compatible	with	
denying	 that	 there	 are	 any	 cubes	 (and	 vice	 versa).	 Since	 the	 commit-
ments	are	not	generated	in	the	same	way,	and	since	one	could	have	one	
commitment	without	the	other,	they	are	different	commitments.	Count-
ing	Principle	1,	which	counts	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	dif-
ferent	sorts	as	distinct	ontological	commitments,	follows	immediately.
We	note	in	passing	that	Quine	explicitly	agrees	with	us	about	(i),	
and	seemingly	about	(ii)	as	well,	when	he	says:
My	remaining	remark	aims	at	clearing	up	a	not	unusual	
misunderstanding	 of	my	 use	 of	 them	 term	 ‘ontic	 com-
mitment’.	The	trouble	comes	of	viewing	it	as	my	key	on-
tological	term,	and	therefore	identifying	the	ontology	of	
18.	 Suppose	that	theory	T
1	
ontologically	commits	to	Fs	but	not	Gs,	and	that	theory	
T
2
	ontologically	commits	to	Gs	but	not	Fs.	It	follows	that	any	theory	T
3
	that	
commits	to	Fs	and	to	Gs	thereby	has	at	least	two	ontological	commitments.	
T
3
	shares	a	commitment	to	Fs	with	T
1
,	and	it	shares	a	commitment	to	Gs	with	
T
2
.	But	T
1
’s	commitment	to	Fs	is	not	shared	by	T
2
.	So,	T
1
’s	commitment	to	Fs	is	
distinct	from	T
2
’s	commitment	to	Gs.	Thus,	T
3
’s	commitment	to	Fs	is	distinct	
from	its	commitment	to	Gs.	
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economy	of	a	theory	is	measured	by	the	number	of	primi-
tive,	undefined	predicates	within	its	ideology.	[3]	
On	Oliver’s	understanding,	if	two	theories	have	minimal	models	of	the	
same	cardinality,	 then	they	are	ontologically	equivalent,	even	 if	one	
theory	asserts	that	there	are	individuals	of	more	sorts	than	the	other.
In	our	view,	this	rests	on	a	misunderstanding	of	Quine’s	distinction.	
Though	the	distinction	is	meant	to	allow	for	the	fact	that	the	use	of	a	
predicate	 in	expressing	a	 theory	does	not	ontologically	commit	 that	
theory	to	the	referent	of	that	predicate,	it	in	no	way	follows	from	this	
that	the	use	of	a	predicate	brings	no	ontological	commitments	—	and	
thus	no	effect	on	ontological	parsimony	—	in	its	wake.	Once	again,	a	
theory	that	says	there	are	red	surfaces	has	an	ontological	commitment	
to	red	things,	but	a	theory	that	says	merely	that	there	are	surfaces	lacks	
this	ontological	commitment.	Simply	put,	ideological	differences	can	
give	rise	to	ontological	differences.
It	may	be	useful	to	provide	another	example.	A	theory	expressed	
in	a	language	containing	a	predicate	such	as	‘unicorn’	has	more	ideo-
logical	resources	than	one	that	lacks	this	predicate.	However,	a	theory	
may	make	use	of	this	ideological	resource	without	thereby	having	an	
ontological	commitment	to	things	of	the	sort	unicorn.	(The	theory	may	
even	include	the	sentence	‘There	are	no	unicorns’.)	In	order	to	acquire	
this	ontological	commitment,	the	theory	must	include	the	claim	that	
there	are	unicorns.	The	ideological	resource	‘unicorn’,	though	it	does	
not	automatically	generate	a	new	ontological	commitment,	makes	 it	
possible	for	the	theory	to	acquire	one.
This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	 ideological	differences	always	entail	differ-
ences	in	ontology.21	We	recognize	that	theories	can	differ	ideologically	
but	agree	ontologically.	For	example,	ideological	differences	between	
theories	may	 fail	 to	entail	ontological	differences	when	the	 theories	
are	intertranslatable.	The	idea	is	that	when	a	theory	can	be	translated	
into	 a	more	 fundamental	 idiom,	 its	 ontology	 is	 thereby	 reduced	 to	
21.	 Indeed,	Quine	says:	“Two	theories	can	have	the	same	ontology	and	different	
ideologies”	(1951a:	14).
that	asserts	the	existence	of	cubes	does	not	thereby	have	this	commit-
ment,	even	if	all	and	only	the	cubes	turn	out	to	be	green.
IV.
Quine’s	 (1951a)	 distinction	 between	 ontology	 and	 ideology	might	 be	
offered	as	evidence	against	our	interpretation.	The	distinction	is	rarely	
spelled	out	explicitly,	but	the	following	provides	a	rough	idea.	A	theory’s	
ontology	is	what	it	says	or	entails	there	is.	A	theory’s	ideology	is	to	be	as-
sessed	in	terms	of	the	meaningful	expressions	—	often	predicates	—	that	
are	 required	 to	 articulate	 it,	 though	 a	 precise	measure	 is	 rarely	 given.	
Quine	introduces	the	distinction	as	a	response	to	arguments	from	phi-
losophers	such	as	Gustav	Bergmann	(1952:	430)	who	hold	that	the	occur-
rence	of	a	meaningful	predicate	in	a	theory	automatically	commits	the	
theory	to	an	ontology	of	properties	or	universals	(see	also	Russell	1912:	
93–4).	These	philosophers	maintain	that	one	is	ontologically	committed	
to	the	meanings	of	expressions	contained	in	the	sentences	entailed	by	
one’s	best	theory.	Quine	rejects	this	view.	According	to	Quine,	theories	
expressed	 using	more	 predicates	 and	 other	 expressions	make	 use	 of	
more	ideological	resources	than	theories	expressed	using	fewer.
The	distinction	between	ontology	and	ideology	would	be	problem-
atic	for	us	if	it	meant	that	different	predicates	play	no	role	in	generating	
ontological	commitments.	Some	ontologists	have	interpreted	Quine’s	
distinction	in	this	way.	Oliver	(1996)	seems	to	be	among	them.	Accord-
ing	to	Oliver,	a	theory’s	ontological	parsimony	is	determined	solely	by	
the	number	of	specific	individuals	it	says	there	are:20
The	ontological	economy	of	a	theory	is	measured	by	the	
number	 of	 entities	within	 its	 ontology.	 The	 ideological	
20.	Lewis	(1992)	offers	a	related	distinction	between	whether things are	and	how 
they are.	 An	 ostrich	might	 attempt	 to	 apply	 this	 distinction	 to	 our	 discus-
sion	as	 follows:	what	a	 theory	says	about	whether things are	 is	 its	ontology 
and	what	a	 theory	says	about	how they are is	 its	 ideology.	This	 suggestion,	
however,	does	not	lend	any	support	to	the	thesis	that	a	theory’s	ontological	
commitments	are	given	by	the	specific	individuals	it	says	there	are.	Whether	
there	are	(e. g.)	dogs	or	things that are red	is	a	matter	of	whether things are,	and	
yet	doesn’t	concern	the	existence	of	any	specific	individuals.
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ontological	parsimony	is	assessed:	she	has	fewer	specific	individuals	in	
her	ontology	than	the	realist	does.	Nonetheless,	given	that	sorts	mat-
ter	in	the	assessment	of	ontological	commitments,	her	theory	is	worse	
along	another	axis	by	which	ontological	parsimony	is	assessed:	she	has	
more	sorts	of	things	in	her	ontology	than	the	realist	does.
This	brings	us	to	our	defense	of	Counting	Principle	2.	We	concede	
that	 the	 realist’s	 universe	 contains	 more	 specific	 entities	 than	 the	
ostrich’s,	 since	 it	must	 also	 contain	 universals.	 In	 other	words,	 the	
minimal	model	of	the	realist’s	theory	is	larger	than	the	minimal	model	
of	the	ostrich’s	theory.	But	we	believe	that	one	should	compare	the	
ontological	parsimony	of	 two	 theories	by	comparing	 their	ontologi-
cal	commitments	to	things	of	various	sorts.	The	more	parsimonious	
theory	has	 fewer	of	 these	 commitments.	On	our	 view,	 the	number	
of	specific	entities	required	by	a	theory	matters	very	little,	if	at	all,	in	
the	assessment	of	ontological	parsimony.	 If	 this	 is	 correct,	 then	we	
should	compare	the	ostrich’s	and	the	realist’s	theories	by	determining	
whether	the	ontological	commitments	listed	as	(1)–(6)	are	greater	in	
number	 than	 those	 listed	as	 (1*)–(4*).	Thus,	 (1)–(6)	and	 (1*)–(4*)	
are	the	only	ontological	commitments	relevant	to	comparing	the	par-
simony	of	the	respective	theories.
This	is	an	even	more	concessive	position	than	is	offered	by	some	
more	 sympathetic	 to	 ostrich	 nominalism	 than	 we	 are.	 For	 instance,	
Quine,	whose	lineage	is,	obviously,	claimed	by	the	ostrich	nominalist,	
holds	that	no	acceptable	theory	carries	any	ontological	commitments	
to	specific	individuals.	All	ontological	commitments,	on	Quine’s	view,	
are	to	things	of	a	sort.	This	point	arises	from	his	discussion	of	the	prob-
lem	of	Plato’s	Beard	(1939;	1953b:	1–3).	As	discussed	previously,	Quine	
thinks	that	a	theorist	should	be	able	to	intelligibly	deny	the	claims	that	
give	rise	to	ontological	commitments	in	any	given	theory.	This	includes	
claims	 involving	 terms	 like	 ‘Pegasus’:	 it	 should	be	open	to	a	 theorist	
to	reject	an	ontological	commitment	to	Pegasus	by	denying	 ‘Pegasus	
exists’.	Quine	worries	that	construing	‘Pegasus’	as	a	singular	term	ren-
ders	 this	position	unintelligible,	 and	 so	he	ultimately	holds	 that	all	
singular	terms	ought	to	be	eliminated	in	favor	of	either	(i)	descriptive	
the	ontology	of	the	theory	expressed	in	the	more	fundamental	idiom.	
However,	 the	ostrich	nominalist	 is	not	proposing	 that	 the	disparate	
predicates	used	in	the	expression	of	her	theory	(‘blue’,	‘sphere’,	‘green’,	
‘cube’,	 ‘orange’,	and	 ‘cone’)	are	eliminable	by	 translation	 into	a	more	
fundamental	idiom.	Indeed,	she	takes	these	predicates	as	irreducible	
primitives:	“[…W]e	have	nothing	to	say	about	what	makes	a F,	it	just	is 
F;	that	is	a	basic	and	inexplicable	fact	about	the	universe”	(Devitt	1980:	
97).	Irreducible	primitives,	we	assume,	are	not	translatable	into	a	more	
fundamental	idiom.
Importantly,	we	are	not	making	the	often-repeated	point	that	re-
alism,	 though	more	 ontologically	 profligate,	 is	 more	 ideologically	
parsimonious	than	ostrich	nominalism.22	The	ostrich’s	theory	incurs	
an	ontological	 (and	not	purely	 ideological)	cost	 in	virtue	of	 saying	
that	there	are	things	of	more	sorts	than	the	realist’s	theory	does.	The	
ostrich	 chooses	 a	 theory	with	 things	 of	more	 sorts	 in	 its	 ontology	
than	 are	 in	 the	 ontology	 of	 the	 realist’s	 theory.	 Thus,	 the	 ostrich’s	
theory	is	more	ontologically	profligate	than	the	realist’s.	
V.
We’ve	argued	for	Counting	Principle	1:	that	the	commitments	listed	in	
(1)–(6)	are	distinct,	as	are	those	listed	in	(1*)–(4*).	As	a	consequence,	
the	ostrich	has	more	distinct	ontological	commitments	(six)	than	does	
the	realist	(four).	At	this	point,	the	ostrich	might	maintain	that,	though	
the	realist’s	theory	is	more	parsimonious	insofar	as	it	is	ontologically	
committed	to	things	of	fewer	sorts,	her	own	theory	is	more	parsimoni-
ous	insofar	as	it	is	ontologically	committed	to	fewer	specific	individuals	
(or	that	the	cardinality	of	her	universe	is	smaller).
We	first	note	that	the	ostrich	has	lost	her	purported	advantage.	She	
has	maintained	all	along	(see,	e. g.,	Devitt	1980:	97–8)	that	her	theory	is	
more	ontologically	parsimonious	(simpliciter)	than	the	realist’s.	She	may	
now	maintain,	at	best,	that	her	theory	is	better	along	one	axis	by	which	
22.	 This	is	how	Oliver	(1996)	sees	the	situation.	Bennett	(2009:	62–5)	and	Sider	
(2009:	416–20)	discuss	the	distinction	between	ontological	and	ideological	
parsimony.	
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of	 that	 sort	 in	 the	assessment	of	ontological	economy.	Theories	 that	
do	not	posit	things	of	the	same	sorts	will	be	strictly	incomparable	as	
regards	quantitative	parsimony.	That	is,	one	cannot	compare	the	quan-
titative	parsimony	of	a	theory	that	posits	seven	protons	to	a	theory	that	
posits	five	electrons.	Along	these	lines,	a	theory	that	postulates	things	
of	many	sorts,	as	does	ostrich	nominalism,	will	be	less	parsimonious	
both	 qualitatively	 and	 quantitatively	 as	 regards	 each	 of	 these	 sorts	
than	a	theory	that	postulates	things	of	fewer	sorts,	as	does	realism.	It	
is	less	parsimonious	qualitatively	because	it	postulates	things	of	more	
sorts.	 It	 is	 less	parsimonious	quantitatively	 relative	 to	each	of	 these	
sorts	because	it	postulates	more	than	zero	instances	of	each	sort.
Why	would	a	philosopher	think	that	ontological	commitments	to	
specific	 individuals	count	 less	 in	 the	overall	assessment	of	ontologi-
cal	 parsimony	 than	ontological	 commitments	 to	 things	of	 a	 sort,	 or,	
indeed,	that	they	don’t	count	at	all?	We	see	three	types	of	reason	for	
supposing	this:
(R-1)	In	canonical	philosophical	disputes,	qualitative	parsimony	
is,	in	fact,	preferred	to	quantitative	parsimony.
(R-2)	In	canonical	scientific	disputes,	qualitative	parsimony	is,	in	
fact,	preferred	to	quantitative	parsimony.
(R-3)	Comparisons	of	quantitative	parsimony	collapse	for	theo-
ries	with	only	infinite	models.
We	will	discuss	these	points	in	sequence.
(R-1):	We	believe	it	is	standard	in	philosophical	disputes	to	prefer	
qualitative	parsimony	to	quantitative	parsimony	in	the	assessment	of	
overall	parsimony.	To	take	an	example	that	is	directly	relevant	to	our	
dispute	with	the	ostrich	nominalist,	many	philosophers	are	unwilling	
to	posit	universals	at	all,	 regardless	of	 their	number.	We	agree	with	
Russell	(1912:	112)	when	he	says,	“[…H]aving	admitted	one	universal,	
we	have	no	longer	any	reason	to	reject	others.”25	We	believe	that	many	
25.	 Russell	makes	a	similar	point	in	(1912:	95–7;	1918:	150).	There	is	a	long	tradition	
of	regarding	inferences	to	things	of	new	sorts	as	less	secure	than	inferences	to	
predicates	 such	 as	 ‘the	 flying	 horse’,	 or	 else	 (ii)	 predicates	 such	 as	
‘pegasizes’.23	So,	strictly	speaking,	no	theories	that	Quine	would	con-
sider	acceptable	entail	that	any	specific	individuals	exist.	Rather,	they	
entail	the	existence	of	some	individual	or	other	of	a	sort:	pegasizers,	
red	things,	sunsets,	magnetic	fields,	etc.
We	concede	that	there	may	be	some	way	of	making	sense	of	a	the-
ory’s	 ontological	 commitments	 to	 specific	 individuals.	One	may,	 for	
example,	consider	 the	minimal	cardinality	of	any	model	of	a	 theory.	
We	will	 call	 the	 aim	of	minimizing	 this	 cardinality	quantitative parsi-
mony,	following	Lewis	(1973).	A	theory’s	quantitative	parsimony	is	the	
measure	of	 its	 commitments	 to	 specific	 individuals.24	 Its	qualititative 
parsimony	is	the	measure	of	its	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	
various	sorts.	A	standard	view	is	that	quantitative,	as	opposed	to	quali-
tative,	parsimony	is	not	a	theoretical	virtue.	For	example,	Lewis	says:	
“I	subscribe	to	the	general	view	that	qualitative	parsimony	is	good	in	a	
philosophical	or	empirical	hypothesis;	but	I	recognize	no	presumption	
whatever	in	favor	of	quantitative	parsimony”	(1973:	87).	Here,	Lewis	
assigns	no	weight	 to	quantitative	parsimony	 in	 the	assessment	of	a	
theory’s	overall	parsimony.	
Daniel	Nolan	 (1997)	 argues	 against	 Lewis	 that	 quantitative	 parsi-
mony	is	a	theoretical	virtue	in	addition	to	qualitative	parsimony,	but	
even	he	would	concede	that	qualitative	parsimony	matters	more	than	
quantitative	 in	 the	 overall	 assessment	 of	 ontological	 parsimony.	 In-
deed,	Nolan’s	notion	of	quantitative	parsimony	is	itself	relative	to	sorts:	
the	quantitative	parsimony	of	a	 theory	can	be	assessed	only	 relative	
to	each	sort	it	posits.	This	suggests	that	the	postulation	of	things	of	a	
new	sort	weighs	more	heavily	than	the	postulation	of	new	instances	
23.	Quine	 later	 comes	 to	 view	 names	 themselves	 as	 predicates.	 This	 change	
makes	no	difference	to	 the	overall	point	we’re	making.	For	a	discussion	of	
these	issues,	see	Fara	(forthcoming).
24.	Richard	(1998)	hints	at	another	way	of	making	sense	of	a	 theory’s	commit-
ment	to	specific	individuals	in	terms	of	hyperintensionality.	The	concerns	we	
will	 raise	 provide	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 quantitative	 parsimony	weighs	 less	
in	the	assessment	of	ontological	commitment,	even	if	one	accepts	Richard’s	
suggestion.
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only	a	finite	number.	This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	 theism	 is	unjustified	or	
untrue,	 just	 that	 its	motivation	 cannot	 come	 from	considerations	of	
overall	parsimony,	as	we	think	is	conceded	by	many	theists.
(R-2).	We	believe	 that	 the	preference	 for	qualitative	over	quanti-
tative	parsimony	in	philosophical	disputes	stems,	as	it	should,	from	
the	same	choice	structure	active	in	scientific	disputes.	Scientists	are	
willing	to	posit	more	specific	individuals	if	it	simplifies	their	overall	
theory	 by	 reducing	 the	 things	 of	 various	 sorts	 that	 they	 posit.	 The	
pre-scientific	view	of	the	world	posited	things	of	disparate	sorts.	This	
theory	was	replaced	by	a theory	that	posits	things	of	a	relatively	small	
list	of	chemical	sorts.	Things	of	these	chemical	sorts	are,	in	turn,	sup-
posed	to	be	reduced	to	things	of	an	even	smaller	number	of	sorts,	such	
as	protons,	electrons,	and	neutrons	(or	even	the	flavors	of	quarks).	For	
instance,	scientists	in	the	past	may	have	taken	there	to	be	a	primitive	
distinction	between	living	and	non-living	things,	or	one	that	appealed	
to	sui generis	vital	forces.	However,	the	distinction	between	living	and	
non-living	things	is	now	explained	in	terms	of	the	chemical	processes	
occurring	in	them.	This	development	required	positing	more	specific	
individuals	and	processes	than	had	been	previously	recognized.	But	
these	specific	posits	paid	their	way	because	they	allowed	the	theory	to	
posit	things	of	fewer	sorts.
(R-3).	A	final	reason	to	favor	qualitative	over	quantitative	parsimo-
ny	derives	from	the	difficulty	of	comparing	theories	with	only	infinite	
models.	The	 specific	worry	 is	 that	 any	first-order	 theory	with	only	
infinite	models	has	a	countable	model.	Thus,	any	two	theories	that	
posit	an	 infinitude	of	 things	will	be	equally	quantitatively	parsimo-
nious.	 It	 is	 this	 concern	 that	 leads	Nolan	 (1997)	 to	 reject	 the	 view	
that	quantitative	parsimony	simpliciter	is	a	theoretical	virtue.	Rather,	
he	endorses	the	more	complicated	“thesis	that	we	should	minimize	
the	number	of	 entities	of	 each	kind	 that	we	postulate”	 (1997:	 341).	
Thus,	a	theory	that	postulates	infinitely	many	sets	and	seven	material	
objects	is	less	parsimonious	than	a	theory	that	postulates	infinitely	
many	sets	and	five	material	objects.	But	two	theories	that	posit	dif-
ferent	kinds	will	be	strictly	incomparable	with	regard	to	quantitative	
nominalists	would	agree	as	well.	If	we	ask	a	trope	theorist	if	she	prefers	
to	posit	one	universal	or	twenty	additional	tropes,	she	will	invariably	
choose	the	tropes.	Similarly,	if	we	ask	an	ostrich	nominalist	if	she	pre-
fers	 to	posit	 one	universal	or	 twenty	 additional	blue	 things,	we	are	
certain	that	she’ll	choose	the	latter.	These	choices	reflect	a	preference	
structure	favoring	qualitative	over	quantitative	parsimony.
To	 take	another	example	 from	a	distant	field,	 consider	 the	differ-
ence	between	an	atheistic	 theory	of	 the	world	and	a	 theistic	 theory	
of	 the	world.	 The	 theistic	 theory	 needn’t	 commit	 to	 any	 specific	 in-
dividuals	beyond	 those	of	 the	atheistic	 theory,	 since	many	religions	
hold	that	their	deity	or	deities	are	among	the	human	beings	or	other	
individuals	posited	by	the	atheistic	theory.26	The	claim	is	that	such	a	
being	is	both	human	and	divine.	Moreover,	theistic	theories,	in	many	
cases,	are	far	more	quantitatively	parsimonious	than	atheistic	theories.	
The	reason	for	this	is	that	they	may	use	their	additional	resources	(i. e.,	
deities)	to	explain	phenomena	where	the	atheist	is	forced	to	posit	ad-
ditional	atheistically	acceptable	processes.	Early	atheistic	theories	had	
to	posit	additional	phenomena	 to	account	 for	 the	weather,	whereas	
theistic	theories	were	able	to	invoke	a	deity	or	deities.	Likewise,	cer-
tain	atheistic	theories	may	posit	that	there	is	no	beginning	in	time	and,	
consequently,	may	be	 forced	 to	 posit	 an	 infinite	 chain	 of	 processes,	
whereas	the	theists	may	simply	posit	a	first	cause,	thereby	restricting	
their	universe	to	a	finite	sequence	of	causes.	We	find	it	clear	that	such	
an	atheistic	theory	is	more	parsimonious	overall	due	to	its	qualitative	
parsimony.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	the	atheistic	theory	explicitly	
posits	an	infinitude	of	specific	objects	while	the	theistic	theory	posits	
things	of	sorts	that	have	already	been	acknowledged.	In	our	view,	these	infer-
ences	are	more	precarious	because	asserting	 the	existence	of	 things	of	new	
sorts	in	one’s	theory	affects	its	ontological	economy	more	severely	than	a	new	
entity	of	the	same	sort.	Of	course,	we	concede	that	less	economical	theories	
are	sometimes	more	justified	than	more	economical	theories.
26.	For	example,	proponents	of	a	simplified	version	of	the	Christian	doctrine	of	
the	trinity	might	hold	that	God	(“the	father”)	and	 the	holy	spirit	are	strictly 
identical	to	the	human	being	Jesus.	If	this	position	were	adopted,	then	anyone	
who	posits	Jesus	would	thereby	also	posit	God	and	the	holy	spirit.
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distinct	 sorts,	 for	 such	 theories	will	 entail	 infinitely	many	existential	
sentences.	Any	two	existential	sentences	‘∃x	Φx’	and	‘∃x	Ψx’	generate	
ontological	commitments	to	Φs	and	to	Ψs,	respectively.	These	commit-
ments	are	distinct,	because	one	can	have	an	ontological	commitment	
to	Φs	without	 thereby	having	an	ontological	 commitment	 to	Ψs.	 In-
deed,	‘Φ’	and	‘Ψ’	will	not	even	be	necessarily	equivalent.	For	brevity’s	
sake,	we	confine	a	fuller	elaboration	of	this	argument	to	a	footnote.27 
This	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 problem	 with	 assessing	 a	
theory’s	overall	ontological	parsimony	by	counting	its	commitments	
to	 things of a given sort:	most	 theories	 entail	 the	existence	of	 things	
of	infinitely	many	sorts.	They	thereby	incur	infinitely	many	ontologi-
cal	commitments.	The	natural	solution	to	this	problem	is	to	privilege	
some	sorts	over	others	 in	the	assessment	of	overall	ontological	par-
simony.	We	will	 first	 consider	 and	 reject	 a	 proposal	 for	 privileging	
some	sorts	over	others	in	terms	of	the	number	of	instances	of	the	sort.	
We	will	then	offer	our	own	proposal	in	Section	VII.
Some	philosophers	might	suppose	that	an	ontological	commitment	
to	Φs	weighs	more	heavily	in	the	assessment	of	ontological	parsimony	
than	an	ontological	commitment	to	Ψs,	if	there	are	more	Φs	than	Ψs.	
On	 this	view,	 the	greater	 the	generality	of	a	 sort,	 the	more	 it	 counts	
in	 the	 assessment	 of	 ontological	 parsimony.	 This	 suggestion	might	
be	 reinforced	 using	 the	 distinction	 between	 general	 categories	 and	
27.	 To	see	our	point,	imagine	that	a	theory	asserts	that	there	are	n-1	cones	in	the	
box.	Consider	the	following	sequence	of	claims	that	follow	from	this	theory:	
(C1)	There	is	an	x	such	that	x=x	and	there	are	fewer	than	n	cones	in	the	box;	
(C2)	There	is	an	x	such	that	x=x	and	there	are	fewer	than	n+1	cones	in	the	
box;	(C3)	There	is	an	x	such	that	x=x	and	there	are	fewer	than	n+2	cones	in	
the	box;	etc.	These	claims	give	rise	to	the	following	ontological	commitments,	
respectively:	(OC1)	Self-identical	things	such	that	there	fewer	than	n	cones	in	
the	box;	(OC2)	Self-identical	things	such	that	there	fewer	than	n+1	cones	in	
the	box;	(OC3)	Self-identical	things	such	that	there	fewer	than	n+2	cones	in	
the	box;	etc.	A	theory	can	consistently	commit	to	things	such	that	there	are	
fewer	than	m+1	cones	in	the	box	without	thereby	committing	to	things	such	
that	there	are	fewer	than	m	cones	in	the	box.	Thus,	these	commitments	are	
distinct,	as	follows	from	the	fact	that	the	sentences	generating	them	are	not	
even	necessarily	equivalent.	A	similar	argument	holds	if	the	theory	says	that	
there	are	infinitely	many	cones	in	the	box.	
parsimony.	As	we	argued	above,	Nolan’s	view	has	the	consequence	
that	qualitative	parsimony	 takes	precedence	as	a	 theoretical	virtue	
over	quantitative	parsimony.
VI.
Until	now,	we’ve	 suppressed	a	 complication	 in	our	discussion	of	on-
tological	 commitment:	we’ve	undercounted	 the	 commitments	of	 the	
theories	of	both	the	realist	and	the	ostrich.	We	will	argue	that	this	un-
dercount	exposes	a	general	puzzle	about	ontologically	committing	to	
things	of	a	sort.	Solving	this	puzzle,	we’ll	argue,	requires	privileging	on-
tological	commitments	to	things	of	certain	sorts	(namely,	those	that	are	
explanatorily	basic)	in	the	assessment	of	overall	ontological	parsimony.
We	have	spoken	of	theories	as	ontologically	committing	to	things	
of	a	sort:	to spheres, green things, universals, particulars, instantiators,	and	
instantiated things.	Moreover,	we’ve	argued	as	if	these	are	the	only	onto-
logical	commitments	that	matter	in	the	assessment	of	the	comparative	
ontological	 parsimony	 of	 realism	 and	 ostrich	 nominalism.	 However,	
the	realist	and	nominalist	theories	have	ontological	commitments	to	
things	of	more	sorts	than	those	listed	in	(1)–(6)	and	(1*)–(4*).	In	ad-
dition	to	saying	that	there	are	blue	things,	the	nominalist	theory	says	
that	there	are	blue spheres, green cubes,	and	so	on.	 It	 therefore	has	an	
ontological	commitment	to	blue spheres,	an	ontological	commitment	to 
green cubes,	and	so	on.	But,	it	also	has	even	more	complex	ontological	
commitments:	it	entails	the	existence	of	green things such that there is a 
sphere:	∃x	(Green(x)	∧ ∃y	Sphere(y)).	Thus,	it	has	an	ontological	com-
mitment	to	green things such that there is a sphere.
The	realist	theory	has	its	own	additional	commitments.	It	is	commit-
ted	to	the	existence	of	things that instantiate green such that there are things 
that instantiate sphericality:	∃x	(IS(x, green)	∧ ∃y	IS(y, sphere));	it	there-
fore	has	an	ontological	commitment	 to	 things	of	 this	 sort.	Moreover,	
since	it	entails	‘∃x	IS(x, green)’,	the	theory	is	ontologically	committed	to	
things that instantiate green.
Simple	 combinatorial	 reasoning	 suggests	 that	 even	 very	 simple	
theories	have	ontological	 commitments	 to	 things	of	 infinitely	many	
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things	constitute	her	most	general	category.	But	this	just	means	that	
any	 assessment	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 ontological	 economy	between	
the	realist’s	theory	and	the	ostrich’s	would	require	some	further	way	
of	screening	which	sorts	matter	to	such	an	assessment.	This	reveals	
that	generality	of	a	sort	 is	an	 inadequate	 tool	 in	 the	assessment	of	
ontological	economy.
VII.
We	have	thus	far	assumed	that	one	theory	is	more	ontologically	parsi-
monious	than	another	insofar	as	the	former	ontologically	commits	to	
things	of	fewer	sorts	than	the	latter	does.	Yet	we’ve	argued	that	almost	
every	reasonable	theory	is	ontologically	committed	to	things	of	an	in-
finite	 number	 of	 distinct	 sorts.	Again,	 this	 suggests	 that	 some	 sorts	
need	to	be	privileged	over	others	in	the	assessment	of	ontological	par-
simony.	So	now	the	question	is:	How	is	this	privileging	to	be	effected?	
Our	answer	appeals	 to	a	distinction	between	explanatorily	basic	
and	non-basic	sorts.	We	believe	that	there	is	a	natural	sense	in	which	
something’s	being	a	blue	square	can	be	explained	by	its	being	blue	and	
square.	More	generally,	in	an	extensional	language,30	the	use	of	atomic,	
monadic	predicates	that	are	not	subject	to	paraphrase	commit	a	theory	
to	things	of	explanatorily	basic	sorts.	More	explicitly,
Monadic Predicates   
A	theory	incurs	an	ontological	commitment	to	things	of	
an	explanatorily	basic	sort	for	each	atomic	monadic	pred-
icate,	P,	such	that	the	theory	entails	‘∃x Px’.
30.	The	 issues	become	more	complicated	 for	an	 intensional	 language,	 such	as	
one	employing	modal	vocabulary.	The	fact	that	something	is	square	may	ex-
plain	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	a	square	or	a	circle.	However,	 it	cannot	explain	 the	
fact	that	the	thing	is	necessarily	a	square	or	possibly	not	a	square.	Attempts	
to	 reduce	 the	number	of	 explanatorily	basic	modal	 categories	 include	Car-
nap	(1947),	Lewis	 (1986),	Sider	 (2001),	etc.,	who	attempt	 to	explain	claims	
about	what	is	necessary	and	what	is	possible	in	terms	of	claims	about	pos-
sible	worlds;	as	well	as	Fine	(1994),	who	attempts	to	derive	what	is	necessary	
for	an	object	from	facts	about	its	essence.
subclasses	that	Quine	(1951b)	attributes	to	Carnap.28	According	to	this	
view,	 ontological	 commitments	 to	 things	 falling	 under	 general	 cate-
gories	weigh	more	heavily	 than	ontological	 commitments	 to	 things	
falling	under	subclasses	of	those	general	categories.	An	ostrich	argu-
ing	along	these	lines	might	suggest	that	since	the	realist	theory	posits	
things	of	two	very	general	categories,	i. e.,	universals	and	particulars,	it	
is	less	parsimonious	than	the	ostrich’s	own	theory,	which	posits	things	
of	only	one	very	general	sort,	i. e.,	particulars.29 
Privileging	 general	 categories	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	 parsimony	
strikes	 us	 as	 artificial.	 It	 isn’t	 clear	why	 the	 ostrich	 counts	 particu-
lars	and	universals	as	the	realist’s	most	general	categories	when	the	
realist	has	a	more	general	category,	namely,	things.	There	are	more	
things	than	there	are	particulars	and	universals	—	indeed,	all	particu-
lars	and	all	universals	are	 things	—	so	the	realist	has	only	one	most	
general	sort	of	entity.	That	is,	the	realist	may	retort	that	she	has	an	on-
tological	commitment	to	things	of	only	one	general	category,	things 
or	self-identical things.	Universals	and	particulars	are	only	subclasses	
of	this	general	category.	Of	course,	the	ostrich	could	also	claim	that	
28.	Quine	 proposes	 that	 the	 distinction	 should	 be	 abandoned:	 “Whether	 the	
statement	 that	 there	 are	 physical	 objects	 and	 the	 statement	 that	 there	 are	
black	swans	should	be	put	on	the	same	side	of	the	dichotomy,	or	on	opposite	
sides,	comes	to	depend	on	the	rather	trivial	consideration	of	whether	we	use	
one	style	of	variables	or	two	for	physical	objects	and	classes”	(1951b:	208).
29.	This	 may	 be	 what	 Melia	 (2005)	 means	 when	 he	 concedes	 that	 “sensible”	
(read:	 ostrich)	 nominalism	 is	 less	 ontologically	 parsimonious	 than	 other	
forms	of	nominalism	(and	realism	if	our	argument	is	correct),	but	suggests	
that	ostrich	nominalism	is	nonetheless	more	“metaphysically	parsimonious”	
than	realism:	“For	although	the	sensible	nominalist	has	dispensed	with	these	
metaphysical	entities	(such	as	universals),	 the	individuals	that	the	sensible	
nominalist	postulates	are	themselves	many	and	varied.	Insofar	as	he	thinks	
that	some	things	have	mass,	other	things	have	charge,	other	things	have	spin,	
and	there	is	no	unifying	or	constitutive	account	of	these	truths	in	terms	of	
something	more	fundamental,	he	has	postulated	many	different	kinds	of	in-
dividuals.	Yes,	the	sensible	nominalist	avoids	a	complicated	metaphysics	but,	
because	of	 the	 richness	and	variety	of	his	 individuals,	his	overall	ontology	
may	still	be	unparsimonious”	(71–2).	We	are	unclear	about	the	distinction	Me-
lia	is	drawing	between	metaphysical	and	ontological	parsimony.	He	appears	
to	describe	a	theory	that	minimizes	the	number	of	the	most	general	sorts	of	
things	(e. g.,	individuals	vs.	universals)	as	metaphysically	parsimonious.
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This	more	metaphysical	notion	of	explanation	is	often	called	grounding 
or	dependence.	As	we’ve	said,	our	argument	requires	only	the	ordinary	
notion	of	explanation.	Nonetheless,	it’s	likely	that	a	proponent	of	this	
more	metaphysical	 conception	 of	 explanation	will	 agree	with	what	
we’ve	said,	since	she	will	likely	agree	that	an	object’s	falling	under	the	
sort	green sphere	 is	explained	by	(is	grounded	 in	or	depends	on)	 the	
distribution	of	the	basic	sorts	under	which	it	falls.
To	illustrate	our	point,	consider	the	ostrich’s	theory	of	the	box	world.	
Her	theory	has	six	atomic	predicates,	which	give	rise	to	six	distinct	on-
tological	commitments	(i. e.,	commitments	to	blue things, spheres, green 
things, cubes, orange things,	and	cones).	Her	theory	entails	the	sentence	
‘There	is	an	x	such	that	x	is	blue	or	x	is	green’	and	is	thereby	committed	
to	things such that they are blue or green.	Thus,	the	ostrich’s	theory	is	onto-
logically	committed	to	things	of	at	least	seven	sorts	of	things.	Compare	
her	theory	to	that	of	an	imagined	opponent,	who,	for	whatever	reason,	
feels	the	need	to	invoke	an	additional	atomic	predicate	applying	to,	say,	
things	that	are	blue	or	green.	The	ostrich’s	opponent	might	say	that	
her	theory	is	just	as	parsimonious	as	the	ostrich’s	since	it	has	just	as	
many	ontological	commitments:	they	both	have	infinitely	many.
We	 disagree	 with	 the	 ostrich’s	 opponent.	 In	 the	 ostrich’s	 theory,	
the	category	being blue or green	is	not	explanatorily	basic.	In	particular,	
something’s	being	blue	or	green	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	it	is	blue,	
or	it	 is	green.	The	ostrich’s	opponent	introduces	an	additional	predi-
cate	—	and	thus	an	additional	category.	Supposing	she’s	not	willing	to	
paraphrase	 sentences	 containing	 this	 predicate	 into	 sentences	 con-
taining	predicates	already	in	the	ostrich’s	theory,	the	predicate	—	and	
the	category	it	represents	—	counts	as	explanatorily	basic.32
We	want	to	determine	whether	realism	is	more	ontologically	par-
simonious	than	ostrich	nominalism.	We’ve	argued	that	a	theory	that	
32.	Analogously,	a	theorist	who	says	there	are	objects	that	are	green	before	time	
t	or	blue	after	t	doesn’t	introduce	any	explanatorily	basic	categories.	By	way	
of	contrast,	a	theorist	who	applies	a	new	basic	predicate,	say	‘grue’,	to	these	
objects	and refuses to paraphrase	statements	containing	‘grue’	into	statements	
containing	 ‘blue’	and	 ‘green’	 thereby	 introduces	a	new,	explanatorily	basic	
sort	to	her	theory.	(Our	example	is	taken	from	Goodman	1983).
This	principle	seems	natural	to	us	since	we	think	that	the	fact	that	a	
molecular	predicate	 in	an	extensional	 language	applies	 to	an	object	
is	explained	by	the	distribution	of	atomic	predicates	that	apply	to	 it.	
Similarly,	 that	 the	 sort	 picked	 out	 by	 a	molecular	 predicate	 applies	
to	an	object	 is	explained	by	the	distribution	of	atomic	sorts	that	the	
object	falls	under.	We	will	argue	that	explanatorily	basic	sorts	matter	
more	in	the	assessment	of	ontological	parsimony	than	explanatorily	
non-basic	sorts.
By	distinguishing	explanatorily	basic	from	non-basic	sorts,	we	don’t	
mean	to	appeal	to	any	special	metaphysical	conception	of	explanation.	
We	believe	that	reducing	the	number	of	explanatorily	basic	categories	
(in	the	ordinary	sense	of	‘explanation’)	is	a	goal	of	good	scientific	theo-
rizing.	A	theory	that	appeals	to	the	categories	massed particle, electrically 
charged particle,	 and	 magnetized particle	 has	 more	 explanatorily	 basic	
sorts	than	one	that	appeals	only	to	the	sorts	massed particle	and	electro-
magnetically charged particle.	The	former	is	thus	less	parsimonious	than	
the	 latter,	 even	 if	 the	 latter	 requires	more	 claims	about	 the	distribu-
tion	of	mass	and	charge	(and	thus	more	explanatorily	non-basic	sorts)	
in	order	 to	account	 for	 the	observed	phenomena.	The	explanatorily	
non-basic	sorts,	on	the	other	hand,	seem	to	count	little	by	comparison.	
Once	they	have	agreed	to	the	existence	of	massed	particles,	scientists	
don’t	 fret	about	saying	that	 there	are	 things that are either massed par-
ticles or electromagnetically charged particles.	This	commitment	to	things 
that are either massed particles or electromagnetically charged particles	does	
not	cost	a	theory	its	parsimony,	or	at	least	does	not	cost	much.
In	saying	that	ontological	parsimony	primarily	concerns	minimiz-
ing	the	number	of	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	explanatorily	
basic	sorts,	we	are	simply	generalizing	this	goal	of	scientific	theoriz-
ing	to	our	most	comprehensive	theory	of	 the	world.	Recently,	some	
philosophers31	 have	 proposed	 that	 ontological	 parsimony	 requires	
minimizing	the	number	of	ontological	commitments	 to	 things	of	ex-
planatorily	basic	sorts	 in	a	more	metaphysical	sense	of	 ‘explanation’.	
31.	 See	discussions	in	Fine	(2001;	2009),	Cameron	(2008;	2010),	Schaffer	(2008;	
2009),	and	Sider	(2009).
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theory’s	qualitative	commitments	matter	more	than	its	commitments	
to	 specific	 individuals.	Taking	each	existential	generalization	over	a	
relational	predicate	 ‘∃x Q(x, a)’	 as	generating	an	explanatorily	basic	
ontological	commitment	means	that	each	specific	individual	posited	
by	a	theory	counts	more	than	the	general	commitments.	The	reason	is	
that	each	name	deployed	in	the	theory	will	presumably	be	the	subject	
and	object	in	multiple	relational	predications.	The	qualitative	commit-
ments	of	a	theory	that	says	that	Sally	loves	John	are	to	 lovers	and	to	
beloved.	 If	 the	theory’s	commitment	 to	 lovers of John carries	 the	same	
weight	as	these	two	commitments,	then	we	will	again	be	conceding	
that	quantitative	parsimony	weighs	the	same	as	qualitative.	For	 this	
reason,	we	 think	 that	 a	 theory’s	 commitments	 generated	 using	 rela-
tional	predicates	(to lovers of John	and	to	those beloved by Sally)	simply	
weigh	less	in	the	assessment	of	overall	parsimony	than	do	the	commit-
ment	to	lovers	and beloved.
VIII.
We	can	now	compare	the	number	of	explanatorily	basic	ontological	
commitments	had	by	the	realist	theory	to	the	number	of	those	had	by	
the	ostrich	nominalist	theory.	Once	again,	the	realist’s	theory	contains	
exactly	four	existential	sentences	generating	commitments	to	things	
of	explanatorily	basic	sorts:	two	involving	atomic	monadic	predicates,	
‘∃x	Universal(x)’	 and	 ‘∃x	 Particular(x)’,	 and	 two	 involving	an	atomic	
dyadic	predicate,	‘∃x∃y	IS(x,y)’	and	‘∃y∃x	IS(x,y)’.	The	realist,	therefore,	
has	things	of	four	explanatorily	basic	sorts	in	her	ontology.
By	way	of	contrast,	the	ostrich	treats	each	atomic	predicate	used	in	
the	ordinary	description	as	explanatorily	basic.	Each	sentence	formed	
by	applying	an	existential	quantifier	 to	one	of	 these	predicates	gen-
erates	an	ontological	commitment	 to	an	explanatorily	basic	sort.	As	
Melia	(2005)	says	(expanding	on	Devitt	1980:	97),
Now	[…]	‘a	is	charged’,	‘a	is	square’,	and	‘a	has	mass’	may	
all	report	metaphysically	primitive	truths	—	there	may	be	
no	 interesting	constitutive	account	 that	can	be	given	of	
invokes	fewer	explanatorily	basic	sorts	is, ceteris paribus,	more	ontolog-
ically	parsimonious	than	a	theory	that	invokes	more.	However,	we’re	
not	yet	in	a	position	to	count	the	explanatorily	basic	sorts	invoked	by	
the	realist’s	theory.	The	realist’s	theory	makes	use	of	an	atomic	dyadic	
predicate,	and	we’ve	not	yet	considered	how	to	determine	the	explan-
atorily	basic	sorts	generated	by	the	use	of	such	a	predicate.
We	hold	that	an	atomic	dyadic	predicate	generates	a	commitment	
to	 things	 of	 two	 explanatorily	 basic	 sorts	 corresponding	 to	 the	 two	
positions	accessible	to	quantification	in	the	predicate.	That	is:
Dyadic Predicate  
A	theory	that,	for	some	atomic	dyadic	predicate	‘Q’,	entails	
‘∃x∃y Q(x, y)’	 incurs	 an	 explanatorily	 basic	 ontological	
commitment	 to	 things	 that	Q	 other	 things.	Moreover,	 a	
theory	that	entails	‘∃x∃y Q(y, x)’	incurs	an	explanatorily	
basic	ontological	commitment	to	things	that	are	Q-ed	by	
other	things.
If	 a	 theory	employs	an	atomic	dyadic	predicate,	 say	 ‘loves’,	which	 it	
asserts	to	hold	between	various	objects,	then	the	theory	incurs	onto-
logical	commitments	to	things	of	 two	explanatorily	basic	categories:	
lovers	and	beloved.
One	might	 say	 that	 this	 procedure	 undercounts	 the	 explanatorily	
basic	ontological	commitments	generated	by	the	use	of	an	atomic	dy-
adic	predicate.	The	theory	introduced	above	that	contains	the	predicate	
‘loves’	commits	not	only	to	lovers	and	beloved,	but	also	to	lovers	of	spe-
cific	individuals	and	those	beloved	by	specific	individuals	(e. g.,	there	
are	 lovers of John,	 and	 those beloved by Sally,	 etc.).	We	 agree	 that	 the	
use	of	 ‘loves’	 and	other	 dyadic	 predicates	may	 generate	 ontological	
commitments	 to	 things	of	 these	additional	 sorts.	However,	we	hold	
that	 commitments	 to	 things	 of	 these	 sorts	weigh	 less	 in	 the	 assess-
ment	of	ontological	parsimony.	We	argued	above	that	commitments	
to	specific	individuals	should	count	less	in	the	assessment	of	ontologi-
cal	commitment	than	commitments	to	general	sorts.	In	other	words,	a	
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unifying	explanation	of	our	experience	 than	 the	ostrich	nominalist’s	
does.	This	is	not	to	say	that	realism	triumphs	over	all	its	competitors.	
Other	forms	of	nominalism,	including	class	nominalism,	resemblance	
nominalism,	and	trope	theory,	offer	realism	a	run	for	its	money.	Our	
purpose	is	not	to	adjudicate	among	these	views.	It	is	merely	to	point	
out	that	ostrich	nominalism	does	not	have	this	advantage:	it	is	not	a	
unifying	explanation	of	our	experience.	Among	the	proposed	unify-
ing	explanations,	Quine	advises	us	to	select	the	simplest	reasonable	
one	“into	which	the	disordered	fragments	of	raw	experience	can	be	
fitted	and	arranged”	(1953b:	16).	However,	the	ostrich’s	proposal,	 in-
sofar	as	we	understand	it,	amounts	to	rejecting	this	project	of	offering	
a	unified	explanation	of	the	disparate	sorts	invoked	in	ordinary	and	
scientific	theorizing,	and	thereby	resting	content	with	an	overpopu-
lated	ontological	slum.33 
Bibliography
Armstrong,	 D.M.	 (1978).	 Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume 1: 
Nominalism and Realism,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Armstrong,	D.M.	 (1980).	 “Against	 ‘Ostrich’	 Nominalism:	 A	 Reply	 to	
Michael	Devitt”,	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly	61:	440–49.	Citations	
are	from	the	version	reprinted	in	Mellor	and	Oliver	(1997).
Armstrong,	D.M.	(1989).	Universals: An Opinionated Introduction,	Boul-
der:	Westview	Press.
Armstrong,	D.M.	(1997).	A World of States of Affairs,	Cambridge:	Cam-
bridge	University	Press.
Armstrong,	 D.M.	 (2004).	 Truth and Truthmakers,	 Cambridge:	 Cam-
bridge	University	Press.
33.	We’d	like	to	thank	Josh	Dever,	Herb	Hochberg,	Rob	Koons,	Mark	Sainsbury,	
and	the	two	anonymous	referees	from	Philosophers’ Imprint	for	their	helpful	
comments	on	the	various	versions	of	 this	paper.	We	owe	special	 thanks	to	
Fraser	MacBride	for	his	detailed	and	insightful	criticisms	of	an	earlier	draft	
of	this	paper.	Bryan	would	also	like	to	acknowledge	that	the	research	leading	
to	these	results	benefited	from	partial	funds	from	the	project	CONSOLIDER-
INGENIO	2010	CSD2009–00056	of	the	Spanish	Ministry	of	Science	and	In-
novation	on	Philosophy	of	Perspectival	Thoughts	and	Facts	(PERSP).
such	 truths.	Another	way	of	putting	 this	 is	 that,	 for	 the	
sensible	nominalist	[read:	ostrich],	there	just	are	charged	
things,	 square	 things,	 and	massive	 things,	 and	 there	 is	
nothing	more	to	be	said	about	the	matter[…].	[71]	
For	this	reason,	we	take	the	ostrich’s	theory	of	the	box	world	to	have	
things	of	six	explanatorily	basic	sorts	in	its	ontology:	(1)	blue things,	(2)	
cubes,	(3)	spheres,	(4)	orange things,	(5)	green things,	and	(6)	cones.	Thus,	
by	our	count,	the	ostrich	has	a	less	ontologically	parsimonious	theory	
than	the	realist.
The	ostrich	might	 retreat	at	 this	point.	She	 too	might	propose	 to	
explain	or	reduce	the	basic	sorts	(1)–(6)	in	terms	of	basic	sorts	in	some	
underlying	physical	theory.	She	might	attempt	to	explain	the	colors	of	
objects	in	terms	of	their	reflectance	properties,	and	ultimately	in	terms	
of	their	mass,	charge,	spin,	the	various	flavors	of	quarks,	etc.	As	Melia	
(2005)	says,	
[The]	 apparent	 ontological	 diversity	 [of	 the	 ostrich’s	
theory]	may	one	day	be	explicable	in	terms	of	a	simpler	
ontology	 […].	But	whether	 such	a	 reduction	 can	be	 ef-
fected	 depends	 upon	 serious	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	
work	—	if	such	work	cannot	be	done,	the	sensible	nomi-
nalist	accepts	the	extra	ontological	commitment.	[72]
We	have	no	objection	to	such	attempted	reductions.	The	ostrich’s	ex-
planatorily	basic	sorts	correspond	to	explanatorily	non-basic	sorts	 in	
the	realist’s	theory.	But	unless	the	ideal	physical	theory	has	four	explan-
atorily	basic	sorts	or	fewer	in	its	ontology,	the	ontology	of	the	ostrich’s	
theory	will	still	be	less	parsimonious	than	that	of	the	realist’s	theory.
IX.
Realism	reduces	a	lavish	ontology	to	a	sparse	one	that	includes	only	
particulars,	universals,	instantiating	things,	and	instantiated	things	as	
its	explanatorily	basic	sorts.	The	realist’s	theory,	therefore,	offers	a	more	
	 	bryan	pickel	&	nicholas	mantegani A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism
philosophers’	imprint	 –		20		– vol.	12,	no.	6	(march	2012)
Devitt,	Michael	(2010).	Postscript	to	‘“Ostrich	Nominalism”	or	“Mirage	
Realism”?’,	 pp.	 20–30	 in	Devitt,	Michael,	Putting Metaphysics First, 
Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.
Fara,	 Delia	 Graff	 (forthcoming).	 “Socratizing”,	American Philosophical 
Quarterly,	a	special	issue	devoted	to	W.V.	Quine,	edited	by	Dagfinn	
Føllesdal.
Fine,	 Kit	 (1994).	 “Essence	 and	Modality”,	Philosophical Perspectives	 8:	
1–16.
Fine,	 Kit	 (2001).	 “The	 Question	 of	 Realism”,	 Philosophers’ Imprint	 1:	
1–30.
Fine,	Kit	(2009).	“The	Question	of	Ontology”,	pp.	157–77	in	Chalmers,	
Manley,	and	Wasserman	(2009).
Goodman,	 Nelson	 (1983).	 Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Fourth	 Edition),	
Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press.
Heil,	 John	(2003).	From and Ontological Point of View,	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press.
Lewis,	David	(1973).	Counterfactuals,	Oxford:	Blackwell.
Lewis,	David	(1986).	On the Plurality of Worlds,	Oxford:	Blackwell.
Lewis,	 David	 (1992).	 “Armstrong	 on	 Combinatorial	 Possibility”,	Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy	70:	211–24.
Lewis,	 David	 (2003).	 “Things	 qua	 Truthmakers”,	 pp.	 25–38	 in	 Lille-
hammer	and	Rodriguez-Pereyra	(2003).
Lewis,	David,	 and	Gideon	Rosen	 (2003).	 “Postscript	 to	 ‘Things	 qua	
Truthmakers’:	Negative	Existentials”,	pp.	39–42	in	Lillehammer	and	
Rodriguez-Pereyra	(2003).
Lillehammer,	Hallvard,	and	Gonzalo	Rodriguez-Pereyra,	eds.	 (2003).	
Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor,	London:	Routledge.
MacBride,	Fraser	(1999).	“Could	Armstrong	Have	Been	a	Universal?”,	
Mind	108/431:	471–501.
MacBride,	Fraser	(2005a).	“Lewis’s	Animadversions	on	the	Truthmak-
er	Principle”,	pp.	117–140	in	Beebee and Dodd	(2005).
MacBride,	 Fraser	 (2005b).	 “The	 Particular-Universal	 Distinction:	 A	
Dogma	of	Metaphysics?”,	Mind	114/455:	565–614.
Beebee,	Helen,	and	Julian	Dodd,	eds.	(2005).	Truthmakers: The Contem-
porary Debate,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.
Bennett,	Karen	(2009).	“Composition,	Colocation,	and	Metaontology”,	
pp.	38–76	in	Chalmers,	Manley,	and	Wasserman	(2009).
Bergmann,	Gustav	 (1952).	 “Two	 Types	 of	 Linguistic	 Philosophy”,	Re-
view of Metaphysics	5/3:	417–38.
Brogard,	 Berit	 (2008).	 “Inscrutability	 and	 ontological	 commitment”,	
Philosophical Studies	141:	21–42.
Burgess,	John,	and	Gideon	Rosen	(1999).	A Subject with No Object: Strat-
egies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics,	New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press.
Cameron,	 Ross	 P.	 (2008).	 “Truthmakers	 and	 Ontological	 Commit-
ment:	or	How	to	Deal	with	Complex	Objects	and	Mathematical	
Ontology	without	Getting	into	Trouble”,	Philosophical Studies	140:	
1–18.
Cameron,	Ross	P.	(2010).	“How	to	Have	a	Radically	Minimal	Ontology”,	
Philosophical Studies	151/2:	249–64.
Carlson,	Gregory,	and	Jeff	Pelletier	(1995).	The Generic Book,	Chicago:	
The	University	of	Chicago	Press.
Carnap,	Rudolf	 (1947).	Meaning and Necessity,	Chicago:	University	of	
Chicago	Press.
Cartwright,	Richard	(1954).	Ontology	and	the	Theory	of	Meaning,	Phi-
losophy	of	Science	21/4:	316–25.
Chalmers,	David	J.,	David	Manley,	and	Ryan	Wasserman,	eds.	(2009).	
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology,	Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press.
Chihara,	Charles	(1968).	“Our	Ontological	Commitment	to	Universals”,	
Noûs	2/1:	25–46.
Church,	Alonzo	(1958).	“Ontological	Commitment”,	Journal of Philoso-
phy	56/23:	1008–14.
Devitt,	 Michael	 (1980).	 “‘Ostrich	 Nominalism’	 or	 ‘Mirage	 Realism’?”	
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly	61:	433–9.	Citations	are	from	the	ver-
sion	reprinted	in	Mellor	and	Oliver	(1997).
	 	bryan	pickel	&	nicholas	mantegani A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism
philosophers’	imprint	 –		21		– vol.	12,	no.	6	(march	2012)
Russell,	 Bertrand	 (1912).	 The Problems of Philosophy,	 Indianapolis:	
Hackett.
Russell,	Bertrand	(1918).	 “The	Relation	of	Sense-data	 to	Physics”,	pp.	
139–70	 in	Mysticism and Logic,	 Saint	 Lambert,	Montreal:	 Penguin	
Books.
Schaffer,	 Jonathan	 (2008).	 “Truthmaker	 commitments”,	 Philosophical 
Studies	141:	7–19.
Schaffer,	 Jonathan	 (2009).	 “On	What	Grounds	What”,	pp.	347–83	 in	
Chalmers,	Manley,	and	Wasserman	(2009).
Schiffer,	 Stephen	 (1996).	 “Language-Created	 Language-Independent	
Entities”,	Philosophical Topics	24/1:	149–67.
Sellars,	Wilfrid	(1962).	“Naming	and	Saying”,	Philosophy of Science	29/1:	
7–26.
Sider,	Theodore	(2001).	Review	of	Charles	Chihara’s	The Worlds of Pos-
sibility, Philosophical Review	110:	88/91.
Sider,	Theodore	(2009).	“Ontological	Realism”,	pp.	384–423	in	Chalm-
ers,	Manley,	and	Wasserman	(2009).
Stevenson,	Leslie	(1976).	 “On	What	Sorts	of	Thing	There	Are”,	Mind, 
New	Series	85/340:	503–21.
Van	 Cleve,	 James	 (1994).	 “Predication	 Without	 Universals?	 A	 Fling	
with	Ostrich	Nominalism”,	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
54/3:	577–90.	
Melia,	Joseph	(2005).	“Truthmaking	without	Truthmakers”,	pp.	67–84	
in	Beebee	and	Dodd	(2005).
Mellor,	D.H.,	and	Alex	Oliver,	eds.	(1997).	Properties,	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press.
Nolan,	Daniel	 (1997).	 “Quantitative	Parsimony”,	British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science	48/3:	329–43.
Oliver,	 Alex	 (1996).	 “The	Metaphysics	 of	 Properties”,	Mind	 105/417:	
1–80.
Parsons,	 Josh	 (1999).	 “There	 is	 no	 ‘Truthmaker’	 Argument	 against	
Nominalism”,	Australasian Journal of Philosophy	77/3:	325–34.
Quine,	W.V.O.	 (1939).	 “Designation	and	Existence”,	 Journal of Philoso-
phy	36/26:	701–9.
Quine,	W.V.O.	(1951a).	“Ontology	and	Ideology”,	Philosophical Studies 
2/1:	11–5.
Quine,	W.V.O.	 (1951b).	 “On	Carnap’s	 views	 on	 ontology”,	Philosophi-
cal Studies	2/5:	65–72.	Citations	are	from	the	version	reprinted	in	
Quine	(1976).
Quine,	W.V.O.	 (1953a).	From a Logical Point of View,	Cambridge:	Har-
vard	University	Press.
Quine,	W.V.O.	(1953b).	“On	What	There	Is”,	pp.	1–19	in	Quine	(1953a).
Quine,	W.V.O.	 (1953c).	 “Logic	 and	 the	Reification	of	Universals”,	 pp.	
102–29	in	Quine	(1953a).
Quine,	W.V.O.	(1960).	Word and Object,	Cambridge:	MIT	Press.
Quine,	W.V.O.	 (1969a).	 “Existence	and	Quantification”,	pp.	91–113	 in	
Ontological Relativity and other essays,	New	York:	Columbia	Univer-
sity	Press.
Quine,	 W.V.O.	 (1969b).	 “Reply	 to	 Hintikka”,	 pp.	 312–5	 in	 D.	 David-
son	and	J.	Hintikka,	eds.,	Words and Objections: Essays on the Work 
of W.V.O. Quine,	 Dordrecht,	 Netherlands:	 D.	 Reidel	 Publishing	
Company.	
Quine,	W.V.O.	(1976).	The Ways of Paradox,	Cambridge:	Harvard	Uni-
versity	Press.
Richard,	 Mark	 (1998).	 “Commitment”,	 Philosophical Perspectives	 12:	
255–81.
